215 Nigeria
Three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and green. The color green represents the forests and abundant natural wealth of the country, white stands for peace and unity.
Flag courtesy of the CIA World Factbook
Map courtesy of the CIA World Factbook
Yoruba copper mask of Obalufon from the city of Ife c. 1300
Government
According to Britannica, under the 1999 constitution, executive power is vested in a president who serves as both the head of state and the chief executive, is directly elected to a four-year term, and nominates the vice president and members of the cabinet. The constitution provides for a bicameral National Assembly, which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Each state elects 10 members to the House of Representatives for four-year terms; members of the Senate, three from each state and one from the Federal Capital Territory, also are elected to four-year terms.
There are two tiers of government, state and local, below the federal level. The functions of the government at the local level were usurped by the state government until 1988, when the federal government decided to fund local government organizations directly and allowed them for the first time to function effectively.
Nigeria is divided into 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, where the country’s capital, Abuja, is located; the constitution also includes a provision that more states can be created as needed. At independence the country was divided into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western. The Mid-West region was created out of the Western region in 1963. In 1967 Col. Yakubu Gowon, then the military leader, turned the regions into 12 states: 6 in the north, 3 in the east, and 3 in the west. Gen. Murtala Mohammed created an additional 7 states in 1976. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida created 11 more states, 2 in 1987 and 9 in 1991, for a total of 30. In 1996 Gen. Sani Abacha added 6 more states.
The Nigerian legal and judicial system contains three codes of law: customary law, Nigerian statute law (following English law), and Sharīʿah (Islamic law). Customary laws, administered by native, or customary, courts, are usually presided over by traditional rulers, who generally hear cases about family problems such as divorce. Kadis (judges) apply Sharīʿah based on the Maliki Islamic code. Since 1999, several states have instituted Sharīʿah law. Although the states claim that the law applies only to Muslims, the minority non-Muslim population argues that it is affected by the law as well. Christian women, for example, must ride on female-only buses, and some states have banned females from participating in sports.
Nigerian statute law includes much of the British colonial legislation, most of which has been revised. State legislatures may pass laws on matters that are not part of the Exclusive Legislative List, which includes such areas as defense, foreign policy, and mining, all of which are the province of the federal government. Federal law prevails whenever federal legislation conflicts with state legislation. In addition to Nigerian statutes, English law is used in the magistrates’ and all higher courts. Each state has a High Court, which is presided over by a chief judge. The Supreme Court, headed by the chief justice of Nigeria, is the highest court.
Civil / National Aviation Authority (CAA/NAA)
Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) is the regulatory body for aviation in Nigeria. It became autonomous with the passing into law of the Civil Aviation Act 2006 by the National Assembly and its assent by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Act not only empowers the Authority to regulate Aviation Safety without political interference but to also carry out oversight functions of Airports, Airspace, Meteorological Services, etc as well as economic regulations of the industry.
Airspace
SkyVector – Google Maps – ADS-B Exchange
ICAO countries publish an Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). This document is divided into three parts: General (GEN), En Route (ENR) and Aerodromes (AD). ENR 1.4 details the types of airspace classes they chose to adopt from classes A through G. Nigeria ANS
Drone Regulations
NCAA- GAD-AC-001 May, 2020
NCAA- GAD-AC-001 NIGERIAN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY May, 2020
0.1 This Advisory Circular (AC) has been developed to provide guidance to operators of RPAS in the operation of RPAs and the means whereby they may safely and legally operate RPA systems. This document also provides guidance to NCAA staff on the processing of operators certificate and approvals for RPA operation. While this document prescribes a means of compliance with legislation, alternate procedures demonstrating an equivalent or greater level of safety may be considered on a case by case basis.
a. Nig. CARs 2015, 8.8.1.33, IS 8.8,1,33
b. Advisory Circular (AC) – NCAA-GAD-AC-002
c. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc. 9868, Doc. 10019, ICAO Annex 1, ICAO Annex 2 and Annex 6 Part I & Part IV.
d. American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM)Standards
e. Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4702/ 4703/4671
f. Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) Recommendations for Certification Specification for Light Unmanned Aeroplane Systems(CS-LRPAS)
0.3.1 This AC is published on this subject in Nigeria and is subject to review as the need arises and the latest and controlled version can be found on NCAA website: www.ncaa.gov.ng.
0.4.1 Flight by remotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs) in controlled airspace and over populated areas presents problems to the Authority in terms of ensuring the safety of other users of airspace and persons on the ground. In the past, safety assurance would normally have been in the form of a prohibition of such activities, however, improvements in the technology associated with RPAs means that the potential exists for the operators of RPAs to comply with any safety, security and privacy requirements imposed by the Authority, which will ensure an adequate level of safety. The penalties for the operator may be increased complexity, increased weight, reduced payload and increased cost.In most cases, these factors will render commercial operations non-viable, however, as costs reduce and miniaturization continues, builders of RPAs may soon be able to develop cost effective solutions to current constraints.
0.4.2 Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), autonomous aircraft and model aircraft are various sub-sets of unmanned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is an aircraft and its associated elements, which are operated with no pilot onboard.
0.4.3 Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) is an unmanned aircraft, which is piloted from a remote pilot station. A remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), command and control links and any other components forms a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System(RPAS).
0.4.4 The RPAS comprises not just the aircraft, it also consists of the RPA ground control system, communications/data-link system, the maintenance system and the operating personnel. Thus, when considering requests for RPA operating approval, the Authority will assess the RPA system as a whole. The guidance contained in this advisory circular should be considered during development of a RPA system.
0.4.5 This Advisory Circular (AC) is issued under the provisions of Nig. CARs part 8 and lays down requirements for obtaining Unique Identification Number (UIN), RPAS Operator Certificate (ROC) and other operational requirements for civil Remotely Piloted Aircraft System(RPAS).
Part 21 of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations sets forth the regulatory requirements for the certification, registration, operations, and surveillance of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) in Nigeria. It incorporates relevant requirements governing the safe operation of RPAS as contained in the ICAO Annexes 1, 2 and 6 Part I & Part IV to the Chicago Convention and the principles of ICAO Docs 10019, 9668 and other relevant ICAO Documents.
(a) This part applies to Civil Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems which are remotely piloted from Remote Pilot Stations.
21.1.1.1 This part sets out:
a. The classification of RPAS
b. Security Requirements
c. The registration and marking of RPAS
d. The issuing, renewal and re-issue of RPAS personnel licenses, ratings, authorizations and certificates
e. RPAS Operating Requirements
f. Requirement for ROC
g. Requirement for Manufacturers
h. Transport of Dangerous Goods
21.1.1.2 Nothing in this Part applies to;
a) RPAS for non-commercial or recreational purposes.
b) a control-line model aircraft (that is, a model aircraft that is constrained to fly in a circle, and is controlled in attitude and altitude, by means of inextensible wires attached to a handle held by the person operating the model); or
c) a model aircraft indoors; or
d) a remotely piloted airship indoors; or
e) a small balloon within 100 meters of a structure and not above the top of the structure; the operation of a remotely piloted balloon or a hot air balloon, or
f) remotely piloted tethered balloon that remains below 400 feet aboveground level; or
g) a firework rocket not capable of rising more than 400 feet above ground level.
21.1.1.3 a flight does not take place indoors in accordance with 21.1.1.2 of this Advisory Circular, if the building in which it takes place has the roof, or 1 or more walls, removed.
21.1.1.4 provided that all drones should be registered on the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority UAV Registration portal.
(a) For the purpose of this Advisory Circular, in addition to the definitions set forth in Part 1 of Nig. CARs, the following definitions should apply:
(1) Accident: An occurrence associated with the operation of any aircraft, including UAS, which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time as it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which—
(i) A person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of—
(A) Being in the aircraft, or
(B) Direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or
(C) Direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or
(ii) The aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which—
(A) adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and
(B) would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to single engine, including its cowlings or accessories, to propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, vanes, tires, brakes, wheels, fairings, panels, landing gear doors, windscreens, the aircraft skin, such as small dents or puncture holes, or for minor damages to main rotor blades, tail rotor blades, landing gear, and those resulting from hail or bird strike (including holes in the radome); or
(iii) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.
(2) Aerodrome: A defined area on land or water, including any buildings, installations and equipment intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of aircraft.
(3) Aircraft: Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.
(4) Air traffic: All aircraft in flight or operating on the maneuvring area of an aerodrome (note 1)
(5) Air traffic control clearance: Authorization for an aircraft to proceed under conditions specified by an air traffic control unit (note 2).
(6) Appropriate authority—
(i) Regarding flight over the high seas: the relevant authority of the State of Registry.
(ii) Regarding flight other than over the high seas: the relevant authority of the State having sovereignty over the territory being overflown.
(7) Approval of area: A defined area as approved under 21.7.1.3(a).
(8) Authority: The Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority;
(9) Authorization: The formal permission granted to an applicant, from the Authority, allowing particular operations with limitations commensurate with the combined operational and system risk.
(10) Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B): One method by which aircraft, aerodrome vehicles and other objects can automatically transmit and/or receive data such as identification, position and additional data, as appropriate, in a broadcast mode via a data link.
(11) Basic operations: Operations that are likely to fall under the lowest risk categories and likely require only registration of the UAS in addition to set restrictions for private use.
(12) Beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS) operation. Unmanned aircraft operations in which the remote pilot does not have to keep the unmanned aircraft within visual-line-of-sight at all times.
(13) Beyond radio line-of-sight (BRLOS). Any C2 Link configuration in which the transmitters and receivers are not in radio line of sight. BRLOS thus includes all satellite systems and possibly any system where an RPS communicates with one or more ground stations via a terrestrial network which cannot complete transmissions in a timeframe comparable to that of an RLOS system.
(14) Commercial operation of UAS: Any UAS operations for hire, profit, gain, remuneration or earnings.
Note 1. — For convenience, the term “air traffic control clearance” is frequently abbreviated to “clearance” when used in appropriate contexts.
Note 2. — The abbreviated term “clearance” may be prefixed by the words “taxi”, “take-off”, “departure”, “enroute”, “approach” or “landing” to indicate the particular portion of flight to which the air traffic control clearance relates.
(15) Conspicuity: Quality of an aircraft (e.g. lighting or paint scheme) allowing it to be easily seen or noticed by others (e.g. by pilots, ATCOs, aerodrome personnel).
(16) Continuing airworthiness: The set of processes by which an aircraft, engine, propeller or part complies with the applicable airworthiness requirements and remains in a condition for safe operation throughout its operating life.
(17) Control area: A controlled airspace extending upwards from a specified limit above the earth.
(18) Controlled airspace: Airspace of defined dimensions within which air traffic control service is provided in accordance with the airspace classification (Note 3).
(19) Controlled flight: Any flight which is subject to an air traffic control clearance.
(20) Control zone: Controlled airspace extending upwards from the surface of the earth to a specified upper limit. Data link Communications: Form of communication intended for the exchange of messages via a data link.
(21) Categories of operation
(a) Category A(low risk). Provides operations that are conducted within defined limitations (e.g. Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only, specifying distances from aerodromes and people, maximum height above ground level (AGL), etc.), flights can take place without the need for any authorization from the aviation authority.
(b) Category B (medium risk/regulated lower risk). This category of operation requires an operational authorization from the Authority prior to the flight(s) taking place; appropriate limitations/restrictions would be applied based on the type of operation, complexity of the UAS and the specific qualifications and experience of operating personnel. Approval for the operation would be based on analysis of a safety risk assessment and any mitigations employed to reduce any risks to an acceptable level. This category encompasses operations where the risk to persons being overflown is greater than what would be permitted in Category A, or involves sharing the airspace with other manned or unmanned aircraft, but is at a level below that where the ‘classical aviation approach’ would be warranted.
Note 3. — Controlled airspace is a generic term which covers ATS airspace Classes A, B, C, D and E as described in ICAO Annex 11, 2.6.
(c) CategoryC (manned aviation approach). This category utilizes the traditional method of regulating manned aviation when the aviation risks increase to an equivalent level. Operator certification, flight crew licensing and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) certification will be required due to the higher associated risk. Operations in this category are primarily considered to be flown beyond visual line-ofsight (BVLOS), however portions of the flight (e.g. launch and recovery) may operate within VLOS (Note 4).
(22) Combined vision system (CVS). A system to display images from a combination of an enhanced vision system (EVS) and a synthetic vision system (SVS).
(23) C2 link. The data link between the remotely piloted aircraft and the remote pilot station for the purpose of managing the flight.
(24) C2 Link Interruptions. Temporary situations where the C2 Link is either unavailable, discontinuous, too slow, or lacks integrity; but where the Lost C2 Link Decision Time has not been exceeded such as to require the RPAS to enter the Lost C2 Link State.
Note 4:- Considering the broad range of operations and types of UAS, the Authority has established three (3) categories of operations covering the whole range of possible operations and associated regulatory regime as outlined above.
(25) Dangerous goods. Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the Technical Instructions (Doc. 9284) or which are classified according to those Instructions.
(26) Detect and avoid. The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate action.
(27) Drones are more formally known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Essentially, a drone is a flying robot that can be remotely controlled or fly autonomously through software-controlled flight plans in their embedded systems, working in conjunction with on-board sensors and GPS. Drones are for non-commercial activities.
(28) Extended Visual Line of Sight. EVLOS operations are operations, either within or beyond 500m / 400 ft, where the Remote Pilot is still able to comply with his collision avoidance responsibilities, but the requirement for the Remote Pilot to maintain direct visual contact with the UA is addressed via other methods or procedures. It is important to note, however, that collision avoidance is still achieved through ‘visual observation’ (by the Remote Pilot and/or RPA Observers).
(29) Fatigue: A physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability resulting from sleep loss or extended wakefulness, circadian phase, or workload (mental or physical activity) that can impair a crew member’s alertness and ability to safely operate an aircraft or perform safety- related duties.
(30) First-person view device: A device that generates and transmits a streaming video image to a control station display or monitor that gives the pilot of a unmanned aircraft the illusion of flying the aircraft from an on-board pilot’s perspective.
(31) Flight termination system: A system that when activated, terminates the flight of an unmanned aircraft.
(32) Fly-away: In respect to a remotely piloted aircraft, an interruption or loss of the C2 link such that the remote pilot is no longer controlling the aircraft and the unmanned aircraft is not flying its preprogramed procedures in the predicted manner.
(33) Flight plan: Specified information provided to air traffic services units, relative to an intended flight or portion of a flight of an aircraft.
(34) Flight recorder: Any type of recorder installed in the aircraft for the purpose of complementing accident/ incident investigation. In the case of unmanned aircraft system, it also includes any type of recorder installed in a remote pilot station for the purpose of complementing accident/incident investigation.
(35) Flight time: The total time from the moment an aircraft first moves for the purpose of taking off until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight (Note 5).
Note 5. — Flight time as here defined is synonymous with the term “block to block” time or “chock to chock” time in general usage which is measured from the time an aircraft first moves for the purpose of taking off until it finally stops at the end of the flight.
(36) Flight visibility: The visibility forward from the cockpit of an aircraft in flight.
(37) Geographical limitation: A restricted airspace volume defined through electronic map data.
(38) Flight termination system. A system intended to terminate the flight and minimize the possibility of injury or damage to persons, property or other aircraft.
(39) Handover. The act of passing piloting control from one remote pilot station to another.
(40) Geofencing: Automatic function to limit the access of the UA to airspace areas or volumes provided as geographical limitations based on the UA position and navigation data.
(41) Guidance Material (GM): Non-binding material developed by the Authority that helps to illustrate the meaning of a requirement or specification Circular and is used to support the interpretation of the Advisory, Standard Scenarios, and outlines additional Acceptable Means of Compliance.
(42) Highly automated aircraft: An unmanned aircraft that does allow minimal pilot(s)’ intervention in the management of the flight.
(43) Highly automated operation: An operation during which an unmanned aircraft system is operating with minimal pilot intervention in the management of the flight.
(44) Human performance: Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety and efficiency of aeronautical operations.
(45) Incident: An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation (Note 6).
(46) Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC): meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling, less than the minima specified for visual meteorological conditions.
Note 6. — The types of incidents which are of interest for safety-related studies include the incidents listed in Annex 13, Attachment C.
(47) Landing area: That part of a movement area intended for the landing or take-off of aircraft.
(48) Lost C2 Link. A situation in which the RPA can no longer be controlled by the remote pilot due to the degradation or failure of the communication channel between the RPS and RPA.
(49) Lost C2 Link Decision Time. The maximum length of time, pre-coordinated with ATS, that the pilot and/or RPAS is allowed to wait while the C2 Link performance is not sufficient to allow the remote pilot to actively intervene in the management of the flight in a safe and timely manner appropriate to the airspace and operational conditions before declaring a Lost C2 Link.
(50) Lost C2 Link Decision State. The RPAS state in which the C2 Link performance is not sufficient to allow the pilot to actively intervene in the management of the flight in a safe and timely manner appropriate to the airspace and operational conditions but the remote pilot and/or RPAS have not initiated the Lost C2 Link state because not enough time (the amount of time is dependent on the operating scenario) has elapsed.
(51) Lost C2 Link State. The RPAS state in which the remote pilot is no longer able to actively manage the flight in a safe and timely manner, appropriate to the airspace and operational conditions, and the RPA is performing pre-programmed, pre coordinated and predictable maneuvers.
(52) Maintenance: The performance of tasks required to ensure the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft, including any one or combination of overhaul, inspection, replacement, defect rectification and the embodiment of a modification or repair.
(53) Maintenance organization’s procedures manual: A document which details the maintenance organization’s structure and management responsibilities, scope of work, description of facilities, maintenance procedures, and quality assurance, or inspection systems. This document is normally endorsed by the head of the maintenance organization.
(54) Maintenance program: A document which describes the specific scheduled maintenance tasks and their frequency of completion and related procedures, such as a reliability program, necessary for the safe operation of those aircraft to which it applies.
(55) Maneuvering area: That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons.
(56) Movement area: That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, consisting of the maneuvering area and the apron(s).
(57) Nominal C2 Link State. The RPAS state when the C2 Link performance is sufficient to allow the pilot to actively manage the flight in a safe and timely manner appropriate to the airspace and operational conditions.
(58) Notice to Airmen, NOTAM: A notice distributed by means of telecommunication containing information concerning the establishment, condition or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure or hazard, the timely knowledge of which is essential to personnel concerned with flight operations.
(59) Operator: A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation. Note—In the context of remotely piloted aircraft, an aircraft operation includes the remotely piloted aircraft system.
(60) Radio Line of Sight (RLOS) The situation in which the C2 Link transmitter(s) and receiver(s) are within mutual radio link coverage and thus able to communicate directly or through a ground network provided that the remote transmitter has RLOS to the RPA and transmissions are completed in a comparable timeframe.
(61) RLP Generic term for Required end to end C2 Link Performance
(62) RLP availability (A)The required probability that an operational communication transaction can be initiated when needed.
(63) RLP continuity (C)The minimum proportion of operational communication transactions to be completed within the specified RLP transaction time, given that the service was available at the start of the transaction.
(64) RLP transaction time (TT)The maximum time for the completion of a proportion of operational communication transactions after which the initiator should revert to an alternative procedure. Two values are specified:
(i) RLP nominal time (TT 95%).The maximum nominal time within which 95% of operational communication transactions is required to be completed
(ii) RLP expiration time (ET). The maximum time for the completion of the operational communication transaction after which the initiator is required to revert to an alternative procedure.
(65) RLP integrity (I) The required probability that an operational communication transaction is completed with no undetected errors.
(66) R-VLOS Restricted visual line of sight. It means an operation within 500m of the RPA pilot and below the height of the highest obstacle within 300m of the RPA, in which the remote pilot maintains direct unaided.
(67) RLTPx The maximum time allocated to the summed critical transit times for a C2 message, allocated to system X.
(68) RPL. Remote Pilot License
(69) Remote flight crew member. A licensed crew member charged with duties essential to the operation of a remotely piloted aircraft system during a remote flight duty period.
(70) Remote flight duty period. A period which commences when a remote flight crew member is required to report for duty that includes a flight or a series of flights and which finishes when the remote flight crew member’s duty ends.
(71) Remote pilot. A person charged by the operator with duties essential to the operation of a remotely piloted aircraft and who manipulates the flight controls, as appropriate, during flight time.
(72) Remote pilot‐in‐command (RPIC). The remote pilot designated by the operator as being in command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight.
(73) Remote pilot station (RPS). The component of the remotely piloted aircraft system containing the equipment used to pilot the remotely piloted aircraft.
(74) Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). An unmanned aircraft which is piloted from a remote pilot station.
(75) Remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS). A remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), the required command and control links and any other components as specified in the type design.
(76) Risk mitigation: The process of incorporating defenses or preventive controls to lower the severity and/or likelihood of a hazard’s projected consequence in an effort to meet safety performance, “Target Levels of Safety,” necessary for flight operations.
(77) Rotorcraft: A power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft supported in flight by the reactions of the air on one or more rotors.
(78) RPAS crew member. A person, other than a remote flight crew member, assigned by the operator, charged with duties regarded to the operation of a RPAS before, during and/or after a flight duty period.
(79) RPAS Flight Manual. A manual, associated with the certificate of airworthiness, containing limitations within which RPA is to be considered airworthy, and instructions and information necessary to the remote flight crew members for the safe operation of the RPAS.
(80) RPAS operating manual. A manual, acceptable to the State of the Operator, containing normal, abnormal and emergency procedures, checklists, limitations, performance information, details of the RPAS and other material relevant to the operation of the RPAS.
(81) RPAS operator certificate (ROC). A certificate authorizing an operator to carry out specified RPAS operations.
(82) RPAS operations specifications. The authorizations, conditions and limitations associated with the operator certificate and subject to the conditions in the operations manual.
(83) RPAS recording system (RPAS RS). The recording system installed in the remotely piloted aircraft system for the purpose of complementing accident/incident investigation. RPAS recording systems consists of the following:
(i) RPA recording system (RPA RS). Any type of recording system installed in the remotely piloted aircraft used to collect and record parameters that reflect the state and performance of an aircraft.
(ii) RPS recording system (RPS RS). Any type of recording system installed in the RPS for the purpose of recording the activity of a remote pilot station.
(iii) Synthetic vision system (SVS). A system to display data derived synthetic images of the external scene from the perspective of the flight deck.
(84) Safety: The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.
(85) Safety Management System (SMS): systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.
(86) Safety performance indicator: Data-based safety parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety performance.
(87) Safety risk: The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.
(88) Segregated airspace: Airspace of specified dimensions allocated for exclusive use to a specific user(s).
(89) Shielded operation: means an operation of an aircraft within 100 m of, and below the top of, a natural or man-made object.
(90) Standard Scenario: A description of a type of operation included in a certification specification issued by the Authority, for which an operational risk assessment has been conducted and mitigations identified that can be applied to a variety of applicants in satisfying Target Levels of Safety for approval (Note 7).
(91) State of Design: The State having jurisdiction over the organization responsible for the type design.
(92) State of Manufacture: The State having jurisdiction over the organization responsible for the final assembly of the aircraft.
(93) State of Registry: The State on whose register the aircraft is entered.
(94) State of the Operator: The State in which the operator’s principal place of business is located or, if there is no such place of business, the operator’s permanent residence.
(95) Target Level of Safety (TLS): A generic term representing the level of risk which is considered acceptable in particular circumstances.
(96) Testing Site: A specific geographical location designated by the Authority for UAS testing and flight operations, managed by the Nigerian Government or delegated entity such as a UAS Club.
(97) Type certificate: A document issued by a Contracting State to define the design of an aircraft type and to certify that this design meets the appropriate airworthiness requirements of that State.
Note 8. – Many unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) do not have, and according to current standards, are not able to be certificated. It is up to the operator to provide the proper mitigations to risk that enable higher risk operations in lieu of more robust and reliable system certification and to use industry best practice standards when available to achieve Alternate Means of Compliance (AMOC).
(98) Unmanned free balloon: Non-power-driven, unmanned, lighter-than-air aircraft in free flight.
(99) Unmanned Aircraft (UA) observer: A trained and competent person designated by the operator who, by visual observation of the unmanned aircraft system, assists the remote pilot in the safe conduct of the flight. Unmanned Aircraft System: An aircraft and its associated elements which are operated with no pilot on board.
(100) VFR flight: Flight conducted in accordance with the visual flight rules.
(101) Visibility: For aeronautical purposes is the greater of—
(i) The greatest distance at which a black object of suitable dimensions, situated near the ground, can be seen and recognized when observed against a bright background;
(ii) The greatest distance at which lights in the vicinity of 1000 candelas can be seen and identified against an unlit background.
(102) Visual Line-of-Sight (VLOS) operation: An operation in which the remote crew maintains direct unaided visual contact with the unmanned aircraft system to manage its flight
(103) Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC): Meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from clouds, and ceiling, equal to or better than specified minima.
(104) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is a type of aircraft that operates without a human pilot on-board. Recent technologies have allowed for the development of many different kinds of advanced unmanned aerial vehicles used for various purposes. An unmanned aerial vehicle is also known as a drone.
(105) Unmanned Aircraft System(UAS) means an unmanned aircraft and the equipment to control it remotely. Unmanned aircraft (UA) means any aircraft operating or designed to operate autonomously or to be piloted remotely without a pilot on board.
(106) Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) operation. An operation in which the remote pilot or RPA observer maintains direct unaided visual contact with the remotely piloted aircraft.
(a) The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in this Part.
(1) AC Advisory Circular
(2) ATC Air Traffic Control
(3) BRLOS beyond radio line-of-sight
(4) BVLOS beyond visual line-of-sight
(5) C2 command and control
(6) CA collision avoidance
(7) CPA closest point of approach
(8) DAA detect and avoid
(9) FCC flight control computer
(10) FMS flight management system
(11) FRMS fatigue risk management system
(12) FSS fixed satellite service
(13) FSTD flight simulation training device
(14) HALE high-altitude, long-endurance
(15) HMI human-machine interface
(16) ICA instructions for continuing airworthiness
(17) IFR instrument flight rules
(18) IMC instrument meteorological conditions
(19) ITU/WRC International Telecommunication Union/World Radio communication Conference
(20) LIDAR light detection and ranging
(21) MA maneuver advisories
(22) MAC mid-air collision
(23) MAWS minimum altitude warning system
(24) MCM maintenance control manual
(25) METAR aerodrome routine meteorological report
(26) ACP Aeronautical Communications Panel
(27) ADS-B automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast
(28) AFIS aerodrome flight information service
(29) AGL above ground level
(30) ANC Air Navigation Commission
(31) ANSP air navigation service provider
(32) ATCO air traffic control officer
(33) ATPL airline transport pilot license
(34) BRLOS beyond radio line-of-sight
(35) C2 command and control
(36) CA collision avoidance
(37) C of A certificate of airworthiness
(38) CPA closest point of approach
(39) CPDLC controller-pilot data link communications
(40) DAA detect and avoid
(41) EM electromagnetic
(42) EFBs Electronic Flight Bags
(43) ETA Equipment Type Approval
(44) FCC flight control computer
(45) FMS flight management system
(46) FRMS fatigue risk management system
(47) FSS fixed satellite service
(48) FSTD flight simulation training device
(49) GM Guidance Material
(50) GPWS ground proximity warning system
(51) HALE high-altitude, long-endurance
(52) HF high frequency
(53) HMI human-machine interface
(54) ICA instructions for continuing airworthiness
(55) IFR instrument flight rules
(56) IMC instrument meteorological conditions
(57) ITU/WRC International Telecommunication Union/World Radio communication Conference
(58) LIDAR light detection and ranging
(59) MA maneuver advisories
(60) MAC mid-air collision
(61) MAWS minimum altitude warning system
(62) MMEL master minimum equipment list
(63) MOR Meteorological Optical Range
(64) NOTAM notice to airmen
(65) MPL multi-crew pilot license
(66) MTOM maximum take-off mass
(67) NM nautical mile
(68) NextGen next generation air transportation system
(69) NMAC near mid-air collision
(70) OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
(71) PBN performance-based navigation
(72) PIC pilot-in-command
(73) PPL private pilot license
(74) RAE recognized assessment entity
(75) RCP required communication performance
(76) RF radio frequency
(77) RLOS radio line-of-sight
(78) RPL Remote Pilot License
(79) RLP Required end to end C2 Link Performance
(80) ROC RPAS operator certificate
(81) RPA remotely piloted aircraft
(82) RPIA Remote Pilot Instructors Authorization
(83) RPAS remotely piloted aircraft system(s)
(84) RPASP Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel
(85) RPASRS Remotely Piloted Aircraft Recording systems
(86) RPS remote pilot station(s)
(87) R-VLOS Restricted visual line of sight.
(88) RVSM reduced vertical separation minimum
(89) RWC remain-well-clear
(90) SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices
(91) SESAR single European Sky ATM research
(92) SATCOM satellite communication
(93) SIP structural integrity program
(94) SLA service level agreement
(95) SLS service level specifications
(96) SMS safety management system
(97) SORA specific operations risk assessment
(98) SPECI aerodrome special meteorological report
(99) SSP State Safety Program
(100) SSR secondary surveillance radar
(101) SWIM system-wide information management
(102) TAWS terrain awareness warning system
(103) TEM threat and error management
(104) TC type certificate
(105) TCDS type certificate data sheet
(106) TEM threat and error management
(107) TLS target level of safety
(108) Ts loss time (sustained loss of link)
(109) TSO technical standard order
(110) UAS unmanned aircraft system
(111) UASSG Unmanned Aircraft Systems Study Group
(112) UAV unmanned aerial vehicle (obsolete term)
(113) VFR visual flight rules
(114) VHF very high frequency
(115) VLL very low level
(116) VLOS visual line-of-sight
(117) VMC visual meteorological conditions
(118) VO Visual Observer
(a) Exemptions under this Part are granted in accordance with Part 1.4 of this Advisory Circular.
(a) This sub-part applies to the Classification of RPAS.
(a) RPA may be classified according to their weight as follows:
(i) Small: Greater than 250 grams or but less than 25kg.
(ii) Medium: Greater than 25kg, but less than or equal to 150kg.
(iii) Large: Greater than 150kg.
(b) There are three (3) main operational risk categories of RPAS:
(i) Open – these present the lowest risk and do not require prior authorization before operating the RPAS but must be registered.
(ii) Specific – these create a higher risk and require authorization to operate the RPAs
(iii) Certified – these require the RPAS and its operator and pilot to be certified and generally treat RPAs like manned aircraft.
(a) No person may operate a RPAS that:
(1) Exceeds its designed performance limitations for any operation, as established by the State of Registry;
(2) Exceeds the operating limitations contained in the RPAS user manual, or its equivalent;
(3) Exceeds the mass limitations, if applicable.
(a) Every person lawfully entitled to the possession of a RPA in Nigeria should register the RPA with a gross mass of 250 grm and more stipulated by the Authority and hold a valid certificate of registration. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.5 UAS
(b) An applicant for the registration of RPAS should access the registration portal at www.rpas.ncaa.gov.ngand complete the application form providing the following information:
(1) the individual or corporate owner of the RPA;
(2) the RPA manufacturer and manufacturer’s designation of RPA;
(3) the serial number of the RPA; and
(4) other relevant data as required by applicable legislation.
(b) Certificate of Registration should be generated at completion registration in accordance with IS 21.3.1
(a) All RPA are required to obtain UIN from the registration portal.
(b) UIN should be displayed on the RPA
(a) The Authority may establish and maintain a RPAS/UAS register containing the following particulars-
(1) The number of the certificate;
(2) The UIN assigned to unmanned aircraft system by the registration portal;
(3) The name of the manufacturer and the manufacturer’s designation of the unmanned aircraft system;
(4) The serial number of the unmanned aircraft system;
(5) The name and address of the owner
(6) The use or conditions with regard to which unmanned aircraft system is registered.
(7) Entry date,
(8) Registration/de-registration date
(a) The Authority may de-register or cancel the registration of a RPAS from the database under the following circumstances—
(1) Upon application of the RPAS owner for purposes of registering the RPAS with another Authority;
(2) Upon destruction of the RPAS or its permanent withdrawal from use; or
(3) In the interest of national security
(a) No person should import/export a RPAS or a component thereof without the approval of the competent security agency(ies).
(a) This Part applies to airmen certification for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.
(a) The Authority may issue a remote pilot license to the applicant if he or she is 16 years of age and has passed:
(1) an aeronautical knowledge examination as specified by the Authority in Part 2.
(2) an aviation license theory examination taken to be an equivalent requirement for the issuance of a remote pilot license; or
(3) the theory component of a remote pilot training course; or
(4) the theory component of a course conducted in a foreign country which the Authority is satisfied is equivalent to the theory component of a remote pilot training course; and
(b) The Authority may issue a remote pilot license to the applicant if he or she has completed:
(1) a remote pilot training course in the operation of a category of the RPA that he or she proposes to operate; or
(2) a training course in the operation of a category of RPA that he or she proposes to operate conducted by the RPA’s manufacturer or an agent of the manufacturer; or
(3) a flight test conducted by the Authority for the purposes of this subparagraph; and
(4) has demonstrated the competencies required for the safe operation of the applicable type of RPA and associated RPA control station, under standard RPA operating conditions.
(c) A person is taken to have satisfied the conditions in paragraph (a)(1) who holds or has held:
(1) a flight crew license; or
(2) a military qualification equivalent to a flight crew license; or
(3) an air traffic control license or a military qualification equivalent to an air traffic control license.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.1
(a) An individual may apply to the Authority, in writing, for a remote pilot license to operate a RPA.
(b) An application for a remote pilot license should be made in accordance with the process specified in Part 2. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.3
(a) The Authority may place a condition on a remote pilot license that would:
(1) allow the person to operate RPA of only a specified make and model;
(2) limit the areas where he or she may operate a RPA; or
(3) allow him or her to operate a RPA only in VMC.
(b) It is a condition of a remote pilot license that the license holder should not operate a RPA above 120 m (400 ft) AGL or within 4 km of the movement area of an aerodrome, unless he or she holds at least one of the following qualifications:
(1) an aeronautical radio operator certificate;
(2) a flight crew license;
(3) an air traffic control license;
(4) a military qualification equivalent to a license mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c);
(5) a flight service license.
(c) It is a condition of a remote pilot license that a RPA should be operated within the visual line-of-sight of the license holder unless he or she has passed:
(1) an aeronautical knowledge examination within the meaning of Part 2 on certification of pilots for the issuance of an instrument rating under Part 2;
(2) an aviation license theory examination that is taken to be an equivalent requirement for the issuance of an instrument rating;
(3) an approved examination; and either:
(i) holds both a RPAS operator certificate and an authorization under AC 1.4.1.4 to operate the RPA beyond the person’s visual line-of-sight; or
(ii) is a member of a RPA operator’s personnel and the RPA operator holds both a RPAS operator certificate and an authorization under AC 1.4.1.4 for the operator’s personnel to operate a RPA beyond their visual line-of-sight.
(d) It is a condition of a remote pilot license that the license holder should not operate more than one RPA at a time unless:
(1) he or she holds an approval to operate more than one RPA at a time; and
(2) the conditions imposed on the approval are complied with.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.7
(a) No person should operate an RPAS unless it is equipped with required instrument and navigation equipment appropriate to the type of operation and category of RPAS.
(b) RPAS should meet the performance and equipment carriage requirements for the specific airspace in which the flight is to operate.
(a) RPAS should have C2 Link equipment that connects the RPS and the RPA and should support the following communication tasks:
(1) data commands to modify the flight profile and the configuration of the RPA;
(2) telemetry data regarding the position, configuration and status of the RPA;
(3) data for communications with external entities, if applicable;
(4) data required for detect and avoid capability;
(5) flight data recording requirements, if applicable;
(6) data to support RPS handover, if applicable; and
(7) link health monitoring functions
(b) The C2 Link should comply with performance requirements as contained in IS:21.5.1.2
(a) ATC communication capabilities should meet the required communication performance (RCP), if an RCP is specified for the airspace in which the RPA is operating.
(b) RPAS pilots should ensure that ATC is made aware of any operation that should take place in areas which are likely to affect manned and controlled air traffic.
Note: The C2 link provide the connection between the remote pilot and the RPA control and may be considered functionally equivalent to, for example, the control wires or data bus between the cockpit and the control surfaces possibly via the FCC. The RPA should therefore use data links that can be assured to meet communication transaction time, continuity, availability and integrity levels appropriate for the airspace and operation. SARPs related to these parameters will be needed.
(a) DAA Operational Requirements
(1) Any RPAS operated in accordance with instrument flight rules should have a DAA capability which enables the remote flight crew to avoid conflicting traffic and other hazards.
(2) DAA should provide the remote flight crew with the capability of exercising vigilance for the purpose of detecting and avoiding potential collisions with other aircraft. The remote flight crew should exercise vigilance even when air traffic services are provided.
(3) When DAA is used to avoid hazards other than conflicting traffic, its use should cause no undue hazard to other aircraft or persons or property on the surface.
(4) DAA should provide the flight crew with the capability of ensuring appropriate action is taken when different hazards are present at the same time, irrespective of whether DAA is provided by one system or different systems.
(5) The remote pilot should be able to intervene in the management of automated hazard avoidance maneuvers except when the C2 link to the RPA is not available.
(6) RPAS controls, displays and alerting should be appropriate to enable the remote pilot to recognize when an action may be necessary to override the automated hazard avoidance maneuver.
(b) DAA equipment
(1) In approving the operational use of DAA equipment:
(i) The Authority should ensure that the DAA equipment meets the appropriate airworthiness requirements.
(ii) The Authority should ensure that the operator has carried out a safety risk assessment of the operations supported by the DAA equipment, including RPAS controls, displays and alerting related to DAA as noted above.
(iii) The Authority should ensure that the operator has established and documented the operational limitations, procedures for the use of, and training requirements for, the DAA equipment.
(c) Automated Collision Avoidance
(1) The RPA should be equipped with a DAA system that is capable of performing automated collision avoidance maneuvers, except where the collision avoidance responsibilities of the remote pilot can be adequately exercised otherwise.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions in 1.5.1.4.(b), the Authority may approve RPAS operations without automated collision avoidance, based on the results of a specific safety risk assessment conducted by the operator which demonstrates how an equivalent level of safety will be maintained. The specific safety risk assessment should include at least the:
(i) reliability of the C2 Link;
(ii) diversity of multiple links, if installed; and
(iii) reliability of other systems that are required to allow the remote pilot to exercise control of the RPA flight trajectory
(a) An RPAS should be provided with navigation equipment which will enable it to operate in accordance with the airspace requirements.
(b) For operations where a navigation specification for performance based navigation (PBN) has been prescribed, an RPAS should, in addition to the requirements specified in 21.5.1.6 (a):
(1) be provided with navigation equipment which will enable it to operate in accordance with the prescribed navigation specification(s);
(2) have information relevant to the RPAS navigation specification capabilities listed in the flight manual or other RPAS documentation approved by the State of Design or State of Registry; and
(3) where the RPAS is operated in accordance with a MEL, have information relevant to the RPAS navigation specification capabilities included in the MEL.
(c) For flights in defined portions of airspace where, based on Regional Air Navigation Agreement, a reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) of 300m (1000ft) is applied, an RPAS should:
(1) be provided with equipment which is capable of: (1) indicating to the remote pilot the flight level being flown;
(2) automatically maintaining a selected flight level;
(3) providing an alert to the remote pilot when a deviation occurs from the selected flight level. The threshold for the alert should not exceed ±90 m (300ft); and
(4) automatically reporting pressure-altitude;
(2) be authorized by the Authority for operation in the airspace; and
(3) demonstrate a vertical navigation performance in accordance with Nig. CARs Part 7.4.1.3.
(d) Prior to granting the RVSM approval required in accordance with 21.5.1.5 (c) (1), the Authority will be satisfied that:
(1) the vertical navigation performance capability of the RPAS satisfies the requirements specified in Nig. CARs Part 7.4.1.3.
(2) the operator has instituted appropriate procedures in respect of continued airworthiness (maintenance and repair) practices and programs; and
(3) the operator has instituted appropriate remote flight crew procedures for operations in RVSM airspace.
(e) The Authority, in consultation with the State of Registry if appropriate, will ensure that, in respect of those RPAS mentioned in 1.6.1.5, adequate provisions exist for:
(1) receiving the reports of height-keeping performance issued by the monitoring agencies established in accordance with Annex 11, 3.3.5.1; and
(2) taking immediate corrective action for individual RPAS, or type of RPAS, identified in such reports as not complying with the height-keeping requirements for operation in airspace where RVSM is applied.
(f) The Authority, in consultation with the State of Registry if appropriate, that has issued an RVSM approval to an operator will establish a requirement which ensures that a minimum of two type of RPAS grouping of the operator have their height keeping performance monitored, at least once every two years or within intervals of 1,000 flight hours per RPAS, whichever period is longer. If an operator RPAS type grouping consists of a single RPAS, monitoring of that RPAS should be accomplished within the specified period.
(g) No Operator should operate an RPA in RVSM airspace without a valid RVSM approval.
(h) The operator should ensure that the RPAS is sufficiently provided with navigation equipment to ensure that, in the event of the failure of one item of equipment at any stage of the flight, the remaining equipment will enable the RPAS to navigate in accordance with 1.6.1.5 (a) and where applicable 1.6.1.5.(b) and 21.5.1.5 (c).
(i) On flights in which it is intended to execute an instrument approach and landing, an RPAS should be provided with a navigation capability providing sufficient performance and functionality to guide the RPA to landing or to allow the remote pilot to conduct a landing under VLOS or through indirect observation utilizing appropriately certified visual surveillance system or methodology.
(j) This capability should be available at each aerodrome at which it is intended to execute an instrument approach and landing, including at any designated alternate aerodromes.
(k) The operator should ensure that the RPA is provided with a navigation capability providing sufficient performance and functionality to guide the RPA to a designated point on the movement area, when the RPA is capable of conducting automated taxiing.
(l) Electronic Navigation Data Management
(m) The operator should not employ electronic navigation data products that have been processed for application in the air and on the ground unless the State of Operator has approved the operator’s procedures for ensuring that the process applied and the products delivered have met acceptable standards of integrity and that the products are compatible with the intended function of the equipment that will use them. The State of Operator should ensure that the operator continues to monitor both process and products.
(n) The operator should implement procedures that ensure the timely distribution and insertion of current and unaltered electronic navigation data to all RPAS that require it.
(a) An RPAS should be provided with surveillance equipment which will enable it to operate in accordance with the requirements of air traffic services.
(b) All RPAS operating in BVLOS should be equipped with a Mode S pressure-altitude reporting transponder which operates in accordance with the relevant provisions of Annex 10, Volume IV. ICAO Annex 6 Part IV Section III
(a) An applicant for an ROC should undergo and obtained a Security Clearance from the Office of National Security Office or any competent security agency(ies).
(b) The RPAS should be stored and prepared for flight to ensure protection against sabotage or other unlawful malicious interference.
(c) The RPAS should be protected in a manner that will prevent and detect tampering, hacking, spoofing and other forms of interference or malicious hijack and ensure the integrity of vital components.
(d) Personnel responsible for programming, preflight preparation and servicing as well as operating and remotely piloting the RPA should be security background checked.
(e) The RPAS operator should comply with any security directives or circulars issued by the Authority.
(a) Access to an RPS should be restricted, commensurate with the size and capability of the RPAS.
(b) Access to computer based hardware should be limited to persons identified and authenticated by the operator.
(a) The operator should develop procedures to ensure that a flight is not commenced unless:
(1) the RPA is airworthy, duly registered and that appropriate certificates with respect thereto are in possession of the RPA;
(2) the instruments and equipment installed in the RPAS are appropriate, taking into account the expected flight conditions;
(3) the RPS(s) used for the flight is (are) serviceable and compatible with the RPA used;
(4) a C2 link with the RPA is expected to be available for the duration of the flight and matches the performance criteria;
(5) any necessary maintenance has been performed
(6) the mass of the RPA and centre of gravity location are such that the flight can be conducted safely, taking into account the flight conditions expected;
(7) any load carried is properly distributed and safely secured; and
(8) the RPA operating limitations, contained in the flight manual, or its equivalent, will not be exceeded.
(a) A RPA is operated in standard RPA operating conditions if, during the operation:
(1) the RPA is operated within the visual line-of-sight of the person operating the RPA; and
(2) the RPA is operated at or below 120m (400ft) above ground level (AGL) by day; and
(3) the RPA is not operated within 30m of a person, measured horizontally, who is not directly associated with the operation of the RPA; and
(b) the RPA is not operated:
(1) in a prohibited area; or
(2) in a restricted area; or
(3) over a populated area; or
(4) within 5 km of the movement area of a controlled aerodrome; and
(c) the RPA is not operated over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without the approval of a person in charge of the operation; and
(d) the person operating the RPA operates only that RPA.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.7
(a) A person may apply to the Authority for the approval of an area as an area for the operation of:
(1) RPA generally, or a particular category of RPA;
(i) An approval has effect from the time written notice is issued to the applicant, or a later day, or day and time stated in the approval.
(ii) An approval may be expressed to have effect for a particular period (including a period of less than 1 day) or indefinitely.
(2) The Authority may impose conditions on the approval in the interests of the safety of air navigation.
(3) If the Authority approves an area under (1), it should publish details of the approval (including any condition) in a NOTAM or on an aeronautical chart.
(b) The Authority may revoke the approval of an area, or change the conditions that apply to such an approval, in the interests of the safety of air navigation, but the Authority should publish details of any revocation or change in NOTAM or on an aeronautical chart.
(c) The Authority should also give written notice of the revocation or change:
(1) to the person who applied for the approval of the area; or
(2) if that person applied for that approval as an officer of an organization concerned with RPA and no longer holds that office, to the person who now holds the office.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.9
(a) A person should not operate a RPA within segregated airspace unless the person has approval to do so from the administering authority responsible for the segregated airspace area. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.11
(a) A person should not operate a RPA in controlled airspace without authorization from the ATC unit responsible for that airspace; and
(b) A person should not operate a RPA in controlled airspace unless he or she:
(1) holds a relevant qualification for the use of an aeronautical radio;
(2) maintains a listening watch on a specified frequency or frequencies specified in the direction; and
(3) makes broadcasts on a specified frequency or frequencies and/or maintains other ways of communication requested by the ATC unit at the specified interval giving the specified information in the direction.
(c) In paragraph (b), relevant qualification means any of the following qualifications:
(1) an aeronautical radio operator certificate;
(2) a remote pilot license [or flight crew license];
(3) an air traffic control license;
(4) a military qualification equivalent to a license mentioned in paragraph (c)(2) or (c) (3); or
(5) a flight service license.
i. specified frequency for particular airspace means a frequency specified from time to time in AIP or by ATC as a frequency for use in the airspace.
ii. specified information for particular airspace means information specified from time to time in AIP or by ATC as information that must be broadcast in the airspace.
iii. specified interval for particular airspace means the interval specified from time to time in AIP or by ATC as the interval at which broadcasts must be made while in that airspace.
(d) The Authority may direct, in regard to a particular RPA or type of RPA, that a person must not operate the RPA, or a RPA of that type, unless he or she:
(1) holds a relevant qualification for the use of an aeronautical radio; and
(2) maintains a listening watch on a specified frequency or frequencies specified in the direction; and
(3) makes broadcasts on a specified frequency or frequencies and/or maintains other ways of communication requested by the ATC unit at the specified interval giving the specified information in the direction.
(e) In this regulation, the person must comply with all directions issued.
(f) ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.13
(a) This rule applies to a person who operates any of the following:
(1) a RPA.
(b) A person to whom this rule applies should:
(1) ensure that before each flight, the person is aware of the airspace designation under Part 14 and any applicable airspace restrictions in place in the area of intended operation; or
(2) conduct the operation under the direct supervision of a person who is aware of the airspace designation under Part 14 and any applicable airspace restrictions in place in the area of intended operation.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.15
(a) A person operating any of the following should take all practicable steps to minimize hazards to persons, property and other aircraft:
(1) a RPA. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.17
(a) A person operating any of the following should not allow any object to be dropped in flight if such action creates a hazard to other persons or property:
(1) a RPA. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.19
(a) In this section, an approved person (AP) means a person or organization having appropriate expertise in the design, construction or operation of a RPA, or appropriate knowledge of airspace designations and restrictions, and who has been approved by the Authority to perform one or more of the following specified functions:
(1) issuing a remote pilot qualification for operating a RPA;
(2) appointing persons to give instruction to operators of RPA;
(3) authorizing a person to notify the air navigation service provider, for the issuance of a NOTAM, of a RPA operation;
(4) authorizing the construction or modification of a RPA greater than 25kg;
(5) inspecting and approving the construction of a RPA greater than 25kg; or
(6) authorizing the operation of a RPA greater than 25kg. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.21
(a) A person should not operate a RPA on or within 5km of—
(1) an uncontrolled aerodrome, unless:
(i) the operation is undertaken in accordance with an agreement with the aerodrome operator; and
(ii) each remote pilot has a RPA observer in attendance while the aircraft is in flight; and
(iii) the RPA is not operated at a height of more than 120 m (400 ft) AGL unless the operator has been approved by the Authority to operate the RPA above 120 m (400 ft) AGL; and
(2) a controlled aerodrome, unless it is operated in accordance with an authorization from the relevant air traffic control (ATC) unit; and
(3) any aerodrome, unless the person:
(i) is the holder of, or is under the direct supervision of the holder of, a remote pilot qualification issued by an approved person or approved aviation organization; or
(ii) is under the direct supervision of a person appointed to give instruction in the operation of a RPA by an approved person or approved aviation organization; or
(iii) is the holder of a remote pilot license issued under 1.3 of this AC.
(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to an operation that is conducted:
(1) outside of the boundary of the aerodrome; and
(2) in airspace that is physically separated from the aerodrome by a barrier that is capable of arresting the flight of the RPA.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.23
(a) A person operating a RPA should:
(1) unless operating in segregated airspace, not operate in airspace within 50m, measured horizontally, of a person who has not given consent for the RPA to operate over them;
(2) maintain observation of the surrounding airspace in which the aircraft is operating for other aircraft; and
(3) not operate the RPA at any height above 120 m (400 ft) AGL except in accordance with paragraph (c).
(b) Nothing in paragraph (a) requires a person to obtain consent from any person if operating:
(1) under the authority of an approved aviation organization; and
(2) in airspace used by that organization.
(c) A person operating a RPA more than 4 km from an aerodrome boundary and above 120 m (400 ft) AGL should ensure that the operation remains within Class G airspace (uncontrolled airspace) and should:
(1) operate in segregated airspace designated for that purpose; or
(2) ensure that at least 24 hoursbefore the operation, a person authorized by an approved person or approved aviation organization, notifies the air navigation service provider (ANSP), for the issuance of a NOTAM, containing the following information:
(i) the name, address, and telephone number of the operator;
(ii) the location of the proposed operation;
(iii) the date, time and duration of the proposed operation;
(iv) the maximum height AGL proposed for the RPA operation.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.25
(a) This rule applies to the following types of aircraft:
(1) a RPA. (b) A person should not operate a RPA to which this rule applies in:
(1) any area in which the person’s view of the surrounding airspace in which the RPA will operate is obstructed; or
(2) meteorological conditions that obstruct the person’s ability to maintain visual line-of-sight of the aircraft.
(c) A person who operates a RPA to which this rule applies should a tall times:
(1) maintain visual line-of-sight with the RPA or be in direct communications with a RPA observer that maintains visual line-of-sight with the RPA; and
(2) be able to see the surrounding airspace in which the RPA is operating; and
(3) operate the RPA below any cloud base.
(d) For the purposes of this rule, visual line-of-sight means a straight line a long which the remote pilot or RPA observer has a clear view and which may be achieved with the use of:
(1) spectacles, contact lenses, or a similar device used for vision correction of the user to no better than normal vision but not the use of an electronic, mechanical, electromagnetic, optical, or electro-optical instrument; or
(2) a first person view system and a trained and competent RPA observer who maintains:
(i) visual line-of-sight of the RPA; and
(ii) sight of the surrounding airspace in which the RPA is operating; and
(iii) has direct communication with the person who is operating the RPA.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.27
(a) To conduct BVLOS operations, the operator should obtain Authorization from the Authority after conducting operation safety risk assessment.
(c) Prior to conducting a controlled BVLOS operation, coordination should be effected with the ATC unit involved regarding—
(1) Any operational performance limitations or restrictions unique to the RPAS (e.g. unable to perform standard rate turns);
(2) Any pre-programmed lost C2 link flight profile or flight termination procedures; and
(3) Direct telephone communication between the Remote Pilot Station (RPS) and the ATC unit for contingency use, unless otherwise approved by the ATC unit(s) involved.
(d) Communication between the Remote Pilot Station (RPS) and the ATC unit(s) should be as required for the class of airspace in which operations occur and should utilize standard ATC communications equipment and procedures, unless otherwise approved by the ATC unit involved.
(e) C2 link transaction time should be minimized so as not to inhibit the remote pilot’s ability to interface with the RPAS compared to that of a manned aircraft.
(f) RPAS operating BVLOS should only operate within Radio line of sight (RLOS). Operation beyond Radio line of sight should require special Authorization from the Authority after indicating all operational control functions and safety measures associated to the type of operation.
(g) Remote Pilot Station for RPAS operations BVLOS will be designed in such way to match the performance of the type of C2 link (BRLOS/RLOS) with which they will be used.
(h) BVLOS operations should be conducted only when the following conditions are met—
(1) The State of the Operator and the State in whose airspace operation occurs have approved the operation;
(2) The PIC has a BVLOS qualification from a recognized training organization.
(3) The RPAS remains in VMC throughout the flight; and.
(4) A Detect And Avoid (DAA) capability or other mitigation is used to assure the RPA remains well clear of all other traffic; or
(5) The area is void of other traffic; or
(6) The operation occurs in specifically delimited or segregated airspace.
(i) Operations BVLOS over heavily populated areas or over open air assemblies of people should require special considerations such as the following—
(1) Altitudes for safe operation;
(2) Consequences of uncontrolled landing;
(3) Obstructions;
(4) Proximity to airports/emergency landing fields;
(5) Local restrictions regarding RPAS operations over heavily populated areas; and
(6) The emergency termination of a RPA flight.
(j) Take-off/launch of RPAS BVLOS should be operated from established aerodromes/RPAS ports or from any other location depending on operational requirements and system configuration, design and performance.
(k) Take-off/launch from aerodromes for BVLOS operations from established aerodromes may be approved after ensuring that the safety of manned aircraft operations is not jeopardized, the remote pilot should consider the following—
(1) Rules pertaining to RPAS operations on or near an aerodrome;
(2) Complexity and density of air traffic;
(3) Ground operations (e.g. taxiway width, condition, other ground traffic);
(4) C2 link continuity;
(5) Payload considerations;
(6) Wake turbulence;
(7) Performance and capability related to take-off distance/run available and minimum obstruction climb requirements, departure procedures and any flight restricting conditions associated with operations to or from the aerodrome; and (8) Availability of emergency recovery areas. ICAO Doc. 10019
(a) A person should not operate a RPA:
(1) in or into a cloud; or
(2) at night; or
(3) in conditions other than visual meteorological conditions (VMC):
(i) unless permitted by another provision of this Part, or in accordance with an air traffic control clearance.
(b) 21.7.1.14 (a) does not apply if the person holds an authorization under AC allowing these operations. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.29
(a) A person should not operate a RPA at night unless the operation is:
(1) indoors; or
(2) a shielded operation.
(b) 21.4.1.15(a) does not apply if the person holds an authorization under AC allowing these operations.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.31
A person who is operating a RPA should give way to and remain clear of all manned aircraft on the ground and in flight.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.33
(a) No person should operate a RPA over a person unless that person is:
(1) Directly participating in the operation of the RPA; or
(2) Located under a covered structure or inside a stationary vehicle that can provide reasonable protection;
(3) Directly associated with the operation of the RPA or the RPA is operated no closer than 50m, measured horizontally from a second person not directly associated with the operation of the RPA.
(b) 21.7.1.17(a), do not apply if:
(1) the person has consented that the RPA is allowed to fly over or near him or her; and
(2) the RPA is operated no closer than 15m, measured horizontally, of him or her. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.35 UAS
(c) Reporting of incidents
(1) The remote pilot-in-command should be responsible for:
(i) notifying the Authority by the quickest available means of any incident involving RPAS.
(ii) submitting a report in a form and manner acceptable to the Authority within 72 hours from the time of incident.
(2) Unlawful Interference. The PIC should submit a report to the local authorities and to the Authority, without delay, following an act of unlawful interference.
(d) Accident notification –
(1) If an emergency situation which endangers the safety of the RPA or persons necessitates the taking of action which involves a violation of local rules or procedures, the Remote PIC should—
(i) Notify the appropriate local Authority without delay;
(ii) Submit a report of the circumstances, if required by the State in which the incident occurs; and
(iii) Submit a copy of this report to the Authority.
(2) Each Remote PIC should submit reports specified in paragraph (1) above to the Authority within 72 hours in the form prescribed by the Authority.
(a) The Authority may grant upon application a temporary Authorization(s) to person(s) intending to operate RPAS not registered in Nigeria—
(1) For a period of fourteen (14) days’ renewable once when the reason for renewal is genuine;
(2) Such application should be submitted to the Authority and processed within four (4) weeks.
(a) The operator should establish and implement a fatigue management program.
(b) The program should address flight and duty times and be included in the operations manual.
(c) The operator should ensure all personnel involved in the operation and maintenance of RPAS receive fatigue management training.
(d) The operator should ensure all personnel involved in the operation and maintenance of RPAS do not carry out their duties while fatigued
Note.— Guidance on fatigue management programs can be found in the Oversight of Fatigue Management Approaches (Doc 9966) .
(a) A registered owner or operator of an RPAS is responsible for maintaining of the RPAS in an airworthy condition.
(b) No person may operate an RPAS for the purpose of performing a flight unless a maintenance pre-flight check is carried out.
(c) No person may perform any maintenance, preventive maintenance or alteration on an RPAS without proper authorization from Authority.
(d) No person may operate an RPAS for which a manufacturer’s maintenance manual or instructions for continued airworthiness has been issued unless the mandatory replacement times, inspection intervals and related procedures are set forth in the Conditions and Limitations approved by the Authority under this Part for ROC holders.
(a) The ROC Holder should ensure that no flight takes place unless:
(1) the RPA is maintained in an airworthy condition;
(2) the RPS is maintained and serviceable;
(3) the serviceability of the C2 Link has been verified;
(4) all the other necessary RPAS components are serviceable;
(5) any operational and emergency equipment fitted is correctly installed and serviceable or clearly identified as unserviceable; and
(6) the maintenance of the RPA and RPS are performed in accordance with manufacturer data.
(b) For each RPA type, the ROC holder should establish and implement a maintenance program in accordance with the manufacturer’s manuals and considering the results of the operational risk assessment.
(c) The operator should not operate an RPAS above 25kg unless it is maintained and released to service by an approved maintenance organization or under an equivalent system, either of which should be acceptable to the Authority. When the Authority accepts an equivalent system, the person signing the maintenance release should be licensed in accordance with Part 1.4 of this Advisory Circular.
(d) Any persons signing a maintenance release should be authorized in accordance with the Maintenance Control Manual of the ROC holder.
(e) For each RPA and for each RPS, the operator should maintain a Technical Log including records of operating hours / cycles as relevant to the type of RPA and RPS.
(a) No person should operate an RPA other than in accordance with the terms of a valid ROC issued by the Authority under this AC.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.15
(a) An application for the issuance of an RPAS operator certificate should be in a prescribed form and submitted to the Authority with evidence of payment of the prescribed fee.
(b) The application should address the following matters, having regard to the nature, degree and risk of the intended operation:
(1) the identification of a person who will have primary responsibility for the operation;
(2) the identification of any person who is to have or is likely to have control over the exercise of the privileges under the certificate;
(3) details of the physical locations to be used in the operation;
(4) an operational risk assessment that:
(i) identifies the known and likely consequences to hazards to people, property and other aircraft of the proposed operation;
(ii) includes a description of the measures that will be implemented to mitigate or manage the risk;
(5) procedures for reporting information to the Authority including incidents and accidents;
(6) operating requirements for personnel licensing, qualifications, training and competency including remote pilot and remote flight crew qualifications, training or medical requirements;
(7) details of the number and specifications of the aircraft to be used, including any identification system used on the aircraft(for example color schemes, unique identification numbers, markings);
(8) details of the control system to be used to pilot the aircraft;
(9) procedures for the maintenance of aircraft and measures to ensure continued airworthiness;
(10) in flight procedures, including minimum distances from persons or property;
(11) procedures for handling cargo, including dangerous goods, or dropping items, if such operations are intended;
(12) the manufacturer’s Declaration of Compliance or approval from an AAO;
(13) procedures for controlling, amending and distributing the application; and
(14) any other approvals that are required to conduct the proposed operation.
(c) The Authority may require only those matters in paragraph (b) that the Authority considers are appropriate in the particular circumstances to be contained in the application.
(a) The Authority may issue an ROC to a person who has applied under this section 21.8.1.2 (b) When issuing anROC under paragraph (a), the Authority may:
(1) impose requirements on the RPAS and may specify procedures to be followed by the operator of any RPA that are operated under the authority of the ROC;
(2) specify any additional conditions that the Authority considers necessary in the interest of aviation safety; and
(3) after considering the type of RPA to be used, determine that any RPA to be operated under the ROC should display identification markings in accordance with 21.3, if the Authority considers that it is necessary in the interest of aviation safety.
(a) If the Authority issues a ROC, the certificate should be issued with an authorization containing the details described in paragraph (b).
(a) The ROC should consist of two documents – the Certificate and the Conditions and Limitations in accordance with IS: 21.8. (c) Contents of the ROC
(1) The ROC should contain at least the following:
(i) the State of the Operator and issuing authority;
(ii) the ROC number and its expiration date;
(iii) the RPAS operator name, trading name (if different) and address of the principle place of business;
(iv) the date of issue and the name, signature and title of the authority representative;
(v) the location where the contact details of operational management can be found;
(vi) the description of the types of operations authorized;
(vii) the type(s) or model(s) of RPA authorized for use;
(viii) the models and locations ofRPS authorized for use; and
(ix) the authorized areas of operation or routes.
(d) Duration of an ROC (1) An ROC, or any portion of the ROC, issued by the Authority is effective and valid for a period of three (3) years unless—
(i) The Authority amends, suspends, revokes or otherwise terminates the certificate;
(ii) The ROC holder surrenders it to the Authority.
(a) The certificate holder is responsible for ensuring that any personnel involved in an operation conducted under the authority of the ROC are notified of and comply with the requirements of this AC.
(a) A holder of a current ROC who wishes to continue to exercise the privileges of the operator certificate beyond its date of expiration should apply for the renewal of the operator certificate by completing the application as prescribed by the Authority.
(b) Amendment of an ROC (1) The Authority may amend any ROC if—
(i) The Authority determines that safety of operation and the public interest require the amendment; or.
(ii) The ROC holder applies for an amendment.
(2) An ROC holder may appeal the amendment, but should operate in accordance with Nig. CARs Part 1.10 unless it is subsequently withdrawn.
(a) Each holder of a ROC should maintain:
(1) A record containing the names of the remote pilots and other crew members involved in each flight, in respect of the system, the time of each flight or series of flights; and
(2) A record containing maintenance action, modification or repair performed on the system, including:
(i) name of person performing the work;
(ii) the dates work was performed;
(iii) in the case of modification, the manufacturer, model and description of parts or equipment modifying the system; and
(iv) if applicable, any instruction provided to complete the work.
(b) Each owner of a RPAS who transfers ownership to another person should, at the time of transfer, deliver to that person all records referred to in paragraph (a)(2).
(c) Each owner of a RPAS should ensure that the records referred to in subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2). (1) are made available to the Authority on request and are retained for a period of:
(i) for the records referred to in paragraph (a)(1), 12 months after the day they are created;
(ii) for records referred to in paragraph (a)(2), 24 months after the day they are created.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.39
(a) Each applicant for the issuance of an ROC should hold copies of all relevant equipment manuals, technical standards and practices, technical bulletins and instructions, legislation, and any other document that is necessary to establish procedures for their operations.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 149.25
(a) A remote pilot or person manipulating the flight controls of a RPA should, upon request, make available to the Authority:
(1) The remote pilot certificate; and
(2) Any other document, record, or report required to be kept under this part.
(3) The remote pilot, RPAS observer, owner, operator, or person manipulating the flight controls of a RPA should, upon request, allow the Authority to make any test or inspection of the RPAS, the remote pilot, the person manipulating the flight controls of a RPA, and, if applicable, the RPA observer to determine compliance with this section.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 101.007
(a) Operations Manual (1) An RPAS operator must provide an operations manual for the use and guidance of the RPAS operations personnel concerned. The operations manual must be amended or revised as is necessary to ensure that the information contained therein is kept up to date. All such amendments or revisions must be issued to all personnel that are required to use this manual.
(2) The RPAS Operator should to provide a copy of the operations manual together with all amendments and/or revisions, for review and acceptance and/or approval, incorporating in the operations manual such mandatory material as may require by the Authority.
(3) The operations manual, which may be issued in separate parts corresponding to specific aspects of operations, should be organized in the following structure:
(i) general;
(ii) RPAS operating information;
(iii) areas, routes and aerodromes; and
(iv) training.
(4) The operator should provide the remote flight crew with an RPAS flight manual for each RPA type operated, which includes each associated RPS model, containing the normal, abnormal and emergency procedures relating to the operation of all the relevant systems associated with the operation of each RPA and of the checklists to be used. ICAO Doc.10019
(b) Safety Management System
(1) A RPAS operator should have a system for safety management that includes:
(i) a safety policy on which the system for safety management is based;
(ii) a process for risk management that identifies hazards to aviation safety and that evaluates and manages the associated risks;
(iii) safety assurance measures that ensure:
(A) hazards, incidents and accidents are internally reported and analyzed and action is taken to prevent recurrence;
(B) goals for the improvement of aviation safety are set and the attainment of these goals are measured;
(C) there is a safety management program that includes conducting internal audits and regular reviews of the system for safety management; and
(iv) training that ensures personnel are competent to fulfill their safety responsibilities.
(2) The operator should document all processes required to establish and maintain the system for safety management.
(3) The operator’s system for safety management should be commensurate with the size of the organization, the nature and complexity of the activities undertaken by the operator, and the hazards and associated risks inherent in the activities undertaken by the operator.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.49
This Part applies to any manufacturer who intends to declare the demonstrated capabilities of their RPA to the Authority for a specific operation(s).
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.301
(a) To meet the requirements for operations for a specific RPAS, the means of compliance should consist of data (tests, analysis, industry consensus standards) and the results or justification used to demonstrate that the RPAS meets the predetermined level of safety the Authority has established as acceptable.
(b) An applicant requesting Authority acceptance of a means of compliance should submit the following information to the Authority in a manner specified by the Authority:
(1) Detailed description of the means of compliance; and
(2) Justification, including any substantiating material, showing that the means of compliance establishes achievement of or equivalency to the predetermined safety level1 .
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.305
(a) For each model of RPAS that is intended to conduct any operation, the manufacturer should provide the Authority with a declaration in accordance with subsection (1).
(1) the manufacturer’s declaration should: 1As described in the Introduction to the ICAO Model UAS Regulations, each State will need to establish minimum safety levels (design or technical) to which manufacturers must demonstrate compliance. It is recommended the minimum safety levels be provided in an advisory circular or other guidance document for ease of amendment.
(i) specify the manufacturer of the RPAS, the model of the system, the maximum take-off weight of the RPA, the operations that the RPA is intended to undertake and the category of RPA, such as fixedwing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, hybrid aircraft or lighter-than-air aircraft; and
(ii) specify that the system meets the means of compliance applicable to the operations for which the declaration was made.
(b) The manufacturer’s declaration is invalid if:
(1) the Authority has determined that the model of the RPA does not meet the terms set out in the means of compliance, or
(2) the manufacturer has notified the Authority of an issue related to the design of the model under section. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.307
(a) A manufacturer that has made a declaration to the Authority under section 1.9.1.3 should notify the Authority of any issue related to the design of the model of the RPAS that results in the system no longer meeting the technical requirements set out in the means of compliance referred in subparagraph 21.9.1.2(b)(2), as soon as possible after the issue is identified. ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.309
(a) A manufacturer that has made a declaration to the Authority in respect of a model of a RPAS under section 21.9.1.should make available to each owner of that model of system:
(1) a maintenance program that includes:
(i) instructions related to the servicing and maintenance of the system; and
(ii) an inspection program to maintain system readiness;
(2) any mandatory actions the manufacturer issues in respect of the system;
(3) a RPAS operating manual that includes:
(i) a description of the system;
(ii) the ranges of weights and centers of gravity within which the system may be safely operated under normal and emergency conditions and, if a weight and center of gravity combination is considered safe only within certain loading limits, those load limits and the corresponding weight and center of gravity combinations;
(iii) with respect to each flight phase and mode of operation, the minimum and maximum altitudes and velocities within which the aircraft can be operated safely under normal and emergency conditions;
(iv) a description of the effects of foreseeable weather conditions or other environmental conditions on the performance of both the system and the RPA;
(v) the characteristics of the system that could result in severe injury to crew members during normal operations;
(vi) the design features of the system and their associated operations that are intended to protect against injury to persons not involved in the operations;
(vii) the warning information provided to the remote pilot in the event of a degradation in system performance that results in an unsafe system operating condition;
(viii) procedures for operating the system in normal and emergency conditions; and
(ix) assembly and adjustment instructions for the system.
ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.311
(a) A manufacturer that has made a declaration to the Authority in respect of a model of a RPAS under section 21.9.1.3 should keep, and make available to the Authority on request:
(1) a current record of all mandatory actions in respect of the system; and
(2) a current record of the results of and the reports related to the verifications that the manufacturer has undertaken to ensure that the model of the system meets the technical requirements applicable to the operations for which the declaration was made.
(b) The manufacturer should keep the records referred to in subsection (a)(1) for the greater of:
(1) two years following the date that manufacturing of that model of RPAS permanently ceases, and
(2) the lifetime of the RPA that is an element of the model of system referred to in paragraph (a). ref: ICAO Model Regulations Part 102.313
(a) The Authority may grant an approval to permit the carriage of dangerous goods without complying with the requirements of ICAO Technical Instructions on transport of dangerous goods, when the Authority is satisfied with the operator’s safety risk assessment. ICAO-U-AID Guidance Material
(a) No person should operate, or cause to be operated or commit any other person to operate RPAS unless there is in force a minimum insurance policy, commensurate with the risk of the operation conducted, in respect of third party risks and proof of insurance document submitted to the Authority.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of 21.11.1.1(a), the authority may dispense with requirement depending on the type of operation.
(a) Any person conducting operations using RPAS fitted with cameras should operate them in a responsible way to respect the privacy of others. (b) No person should use a RPAS to do any of the following—
(1) conduct surveillance of—
(i) A person without the person’s consent.
(ii) Private real property without the consent of the owner.
(2) Photograph or film an individual, without the individual’s consent, for the purpose of publishing or otherwise publicly disseminating the photograph or film. This requirement should not apply to news gathering, or events or places to which the general public is invited.
(c) Infrared or other similar thermal imaging technology equipment fitted on RPAS should only be for the sole purpose of—
(1) Scientific investigation;
(2) Scientific research;
(3) Mapping and evaluating the earth’s surface, including terrain and surface water bodies and other features;
(4) Investigation or evaluation of crops, livestock, or farming operations;
(5) Investigation of forests and forest management;
(6) Other similar investigations of vegetation or wildlife;
(7) Border surveillance as approved by the Authority.
(a) No person should cause things to be dropped or discharged from an RPAS in a way that creates a hazard to another aircraft, persons or property.
(a) Any RPAS Operator or employee of an operator, who knows of a violation under this Advisory Circular, should report it to the Authority.
(b) Any person who has a complaint of any operation of an RPAS should report to the Authority and the Authority will determine if additional investigation is required.
RPAS ADVISORY CIRCULAR IMPLEMENTING STANDARDS (IS)
NCAA-GAD-AC-002 APRIL 2019
NCAA-GAD-AC-002 – UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA’S AIRSPACE – GUIDANCE – APRIL 2019 – 2nd Edition
Pursuant to Nig. CARs Part 8.8.1.33, the Authority may, from time to time, issue advisory circulars (ACs) on any aspect of safety in civil aviation.
This AC contains information about standards, practices and procedures acceptable to the Authority.
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
FIR Flight Information Region FISO
Policy
1.1 It is NCAA policy that UAS operating in the Nigerian Airspace must meet at least the same safety and operational standards as manned aircraft. Thus, UAS operations must be as safe as manned aircraft insofar as they must not present or create a greater hazard to persons, property, vehicles or vessels, whilst in the air or on the ground, than that attributable to the operations of manned aircraft of equivalent class or category.
1.2 In consideration of the limited aviation background of some UAS manufacturers and operators, the guidance contained herein is necessarily prescriptive. The NCAA will supplement NCAA-GAD-AC-002 with further written guidance when required. Rules for Avoiding Aerial Collisions are set out in the Nig. CARs. For the purpose of UAS operations, the ‘See and Avoid’ principle employed in manned aircraft is referred to as ‘Detect and Avoid’.
1.3 Edition 2 of NCAA-GAD-AC-002 introduces a Concept of Operations (ConOps) approach for UAS and moves away from a mass centric classification approach. In doing so it describes how UAS operations should be approached so that all functional areas of the operations are considered.
Scope
1.4 The guidance within NCAA-GAD-AC-002 concerns unmanned aircraft and UAS as they are defined in the Glossary of Terms. It primarily focuses on the aspects connected with Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), whilst acknowledging the potential for autonomous operations in the future.
1.5 Similarly the guidance for operating model aircraft for sporting and recreational purposes is not included, this guidance is published in NCAA-GAD-AC-005: GENERAL SAFETY PRACTICES FOR MODEL AIRCRAFT.
– Nig. CARs 2015
Scope
4.1 This Chapter applies to all civil UAS operations in Nigeria airspace. State (non-military) operated UAS are expected to comply with this Chapter, unless otherwise directed by the NCAA.
4.2 UAS operations conducted for the purposes of testing or development under Design, Production or Maintenance approvals are expected to comply with this Chapter as far as is practicable. However, qualification requirements for Remote Pilots engaged in such operations will be assessed by the NCAA at the point of submission for operating approval.
Policy
4.3 The requirements for the licensing and training of Nigerian civil Remote Pilots have not yet been fully developed. It is expected that Nig. CARs requirements will ultimately be determined by ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).
4.4 ICAO is currently developing standards for a Remote Pilot’s License (RPL). However until formal licensing requirements are in place the NCAA will determine the relevant requirements on a case-by-case basis. In determining whether to permit a person to act as pilot or commander of a UAS, the NCAA will consider a number of factors (based upon the ConOps approach) such as pilot experience, maximum aircraft mass, flight control mode, operational control and safety assessment.
Maximum Operating Mass
4.5 UAS are currently classified into four categories relating to aircraft mass; the flight crew qualification requirements are related to these. Table 5 details the anticipated qualification level requirement for pilots of UAS in the relevant aircraft mass category.
Scope
3.1 This guidance relates to the regulatory interpretation of the term “autonomous” and provides clarification on the use of high authority automated systems in civil UAS.
Introduction
3.2 The dictionary definition of autonomy is “freedom from external control or influence”. The need to meet the safety requirements as determined in the various Certification Specifications for “Equipment, Systems and Installations”, means that at this point in time all UAS systems are required to perform deterministically. This means that their response to any set of inputs must be the result of a pre-designed data evaluation output activation process. As a result, there are currently no UAS related systems that meet the definition of autonomous.
3.3 In general, UAS systems fall in to two categories:
– Highly automated – those systems that still require inputs from a human operator (e.g. confirmation of a proposed action) but which can implement the action without further human interaction once the initial input has been provided.
– High authority automated systems – those systems that can evaluate data, select a course of action and implement that action without the need for human input. Good examples of these systems are flight control systems and engine control systems that are designed to control certain aspects of aircraft behaviour without input from the flight crew.
3.4 The concept of an “autonomous” UAS is a system that will do everything for itself using high authority automated systems. It will be able to follow the planned route, communicate with Aircraft Controllers and other airspace users, detect, diagnose and recover from faults and operate at least as safely as a system with continuous human involvement. In essence, an autonomous UAS will be equipped with high authority control systems that can act without input from a human.
What is the Difference between Automation and Authority?
3.5 Automation is the capability of a system to act using a set of pre-designed functions without human interaction (e.g. robotic manufacturing).
3.6 The level of authority a system has is defined by the results that the system can achieve. For example a flight control computer will be limited in terms of the amount of bank angle it can command (e.g. 45°) whereas the human flight crew will be able to demand up to 60° of bank. A full authority system will be able to achieve the same results as a human operator.
Use of High Authority Automatic Systems
3.7 High authority automatic systems have the capability to take actions based on an evaluation of a given dataset that represents the current situation including the status of all the relevant systems, geographical data and environmental data.
3.8 Although these systems will take actions based on an evaluation of a given dataset they are required to be deterministic in that the system must always respond in the same way to the same set of data. This means that the designs of the associated monitoring and control systems need to be carefully considered such that the actions related to any given dataset are appropriate and will not be a hazard either the aircraft or any third parties in the same area.
3.9 High authority automatic systems are usually composed of a number of subsystems used to gather data, evaluate data, select an appropriate set of actions and issue commands to related control systems. These systems can include flight management systems, detect and avoid systems, power management systems, etc.
3.10 In an UAS a system can have authority over two types of function: general control system functions (e.g. flight control computers) and navigational commands.
Delegation to a High Authority Automatic System
3.11 The concept of high authority automatic systems covers a range of varying degrees of system authority ranging from full authority where the systems are capable of operating without human control or oversight to lesser levels of authority where the system is dependent upon some degree of human input (e.g. confirmation of proposed actions).
3.12 The level of authority a system can have with respect to navigational commands may vary during any flight, dependent upon the hazards the aircraft is faced with (e.g. terrain or potential airborne conflict with other aircraft) and the time available for the human operator to effectively intervene. If the aircraft is flying in clear airspace with no nearby terrain the system may be designed such that any flight instructions (e.g. amendment to a flight plan) are instigated by a human operator. However, if the aircraft is faced with an immediate hazard (terrain/other aircraft) and there is insufficient time for a human operator to intervene (based on signal latency etc.) the UAS will need to be able to mitigate that risk. These mitigations may include the use of full authority automatic systems.
3.13 Although it is anticipated that most systems will be operated using a lesser level of authority, the design of the overall system (control station, air vehicle and related operational procedures) will need to take account of the failure conditions associated with loss of the command and control communications link between the control station and the air vehicle and this may drive a need for the use of full authority systems.
Potential Future Developments
Learning/Self Modifying Systems
3.14 A learning or self-modifying system is one that uses data related to previous actions to modify its outputs such that their results are closer to a previously defined desired outcome. Although learning systems do have the potential to be used in UAS, the overall safety requirements as determined in the various Certification Specifications for “Equipment, Systems and Installations” still apply. This means that it may not be possible to use these systems to their full potential.
3.15 It is also important to note that these systems have the potential to be more susceptible to the effects of emergent behavior and, as such, the evaluation of such systems would out of necessity need to be very detailed.
Other Potential Developments
3.16 It is possible that, at some point in the future, the aviation industry may consider the use of non-deterministic systems to improve overall system flexibility and performance.
3.17 Whilst there are no regulations that specifically prohibit this, the use of nondeterministic systems will drive a number of system and operational safety assessment issues that will need to be addressed before the use of this type of technology could be accepted for use in aviation.
Policy General
3.18 All past and current civil aircraft operations and standards have an inherent assumption that a competent human is able to intervene and take direct control within a few seconds at any stage, and that the human will have been presented with enough information to have continuous situational awareness. It is to be expected that, for the foreseeable future, the civil aviation authorities would require this human intervention facility to be available for all UAS regardless of their level of autonomy
Human Authority over Autonomous UAS
3.19 NCAA policy is that all UAS must be under the command of a Remote Pilot. Dependent upon the level of autonomy, a Remote Pilot may simultaneously assume responsibility for more than one aircraft, particularly when this can be accomplished safely whilst directing the activities of one or more other Remote Pilots. However, if this option is to be facilitated the applicant will need to demonstrate that the associated human factors issues (displayed information, communication protocols, etc) have been fully considered and mitigated.
Safe Operation with Other Airspace Users
3.20 Autonomous UAS must demonstrate an equivalent level of compliance with the rules and procedures that apply to manned aircraft. It is expected that this will require the inclusion of an approved Detect and Avoid capability when UAS are operating outside segregated airspace.
Compliance with Air Traffic Management Requirements
3.21 Autonomous UAS operation is expected to be transparent to ATM providers and other airspace users. The autonomous UAS will be required to comply with any valid ATC instruction or a request for information made by an ATM unit in the same way and within the same timeframe that the pilot of a manned aircraft would. These instructions may take a variety of forms and, for example, may be to follow another aircraft or to confirm that another aircraft is in visual sight.
Emergencies
3.22 The decision making function(s) of any autonomous UAS must be capable of handling the same range of exceptional and emergency conditions as manned aircraft, as well as ensuring that malfunction or loss of the decision making function(s) itself does not cause a reduction in safety.
Factors for Consideration when Applying for Certification of Autonomous Systems
Data Integrity
3.23 Autonomous systems select particular actions based on the data they receive from sensors related to the aircraft environment (airspeed, altitude, met data etc), system status indicators (fault flags, etc), navigational data (programmed flight plans, GPS, etc.) and command and control data received from control stations. As such, UAS developers will need to ensure that any data related to autonomous control has a sufficient level of integrity such that the ability to comply with basic safety requirements is maintained. This will require the development of appropriately robust communication and data validation systems.
Security
3.24 An autonomous system must be demonstrated to be protected from accepting unauthorized commands, or from being “spoofed” by false or misleading data. Consequently, UAS will have a high degree of dependence upon secure communications, even if they are designed to be capable of detecting and rejecting false or misleading commands.
Scope
4.1 This chapter offers guidance to industry on how to implement and satisfy the requirements for security through all UAS lifecycle activities (i.e. initial concept, development, operation and maintenance and decommissioning).
Policy
4.2 It is NCAA Policy that any UAS operating outside of a Nigeria Danger Areas will not increase the risk to existing airspace users and will not deny airspace to them. This policy requires a level of safety and security equivalent to that of manned aviation.
4.3 Current policy also states that an UAS must have adequate security to protect the system from unauthorized modification, interference, corruption of control/command action.
Factors for Consideration when Developing Security for UAS
Holistic Approach
4.4 When considering security for the UAS it is important to take a holistic approach, paying equal cognizance to technical, policy and physical security for the UAS as a whole. Utilizing this approach will help ensure that issues are not overlooked that may affect security and ultimately safety.
4.5 By utilizing proven industry approaches to the protection of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA), security measures applied can benefit the UAS operator by assuring availability of service and the integrity and confidentiality of both data and operations.
Security Aspects to be addressed
4.6 Security aspects are required to address particular potential weaknesses to UAS such as employees, location, accessibility, technology, management structure and governance.
4.7 Such security aspects include but are not limited to:
– The availability of system assets, e.g. ensuring that system assets and information are accessible to authorized personnel or processes without undue delay;
– Physical security of system elements and assets, e.g. ensuring adequate physical protection is afforded to system assets;
– Procedural security for the secure and safe operation of the system, e.g. ensuring adequate policies such as Security Operating Procedures are drafted, applied, reviewed and maintained;
– Data exchange between system elements, e.g. ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of critical assets is maintained during exchanges within the system, over communication channels and by other means such as physical media;
– Accuracy and integrity of system assets, e.g. ensuring threats to system assets caused by inaccuracies in data, misrouting of messages and software/hardware corruption are minimized and actual errors are detected;
– Access control to system elements, e.g. ensuring access to system assets is restricted to persons or processes with the appropriate authority and ’need-to-know’;
– Authentication and identification to system assets, e.g. ensuring all individuals and processes requiring access to system assets can be reliably identified and their authorization established;
– Accounting of system assets, e.g. ensuring that individual accountability for system assets is enforced so as to impede and deter any person or process, having gained access to system assets, from adversely affecting the system availability, integrity and confidentiality;
– Auditing and Accountability of system assets e.g. ensure that attempted breaches of security are impeded, and that actual breaches of security are revealed. All such attempted and actual security incidents must be investigated by dedicated investigation staff and reports produced;
– Object Reuse of system assets, e.g. ensure that any system resources re-usage, such as processes, transitory storage areas and areas of disk archive storage, maintains availability, integrity and confidentiality of assets;
– Asset Retention, e.g. ensuring that system assets are securely retained and stored whilst maintaining availability, integrity and confidentiality.
4.8 Identified and derived requirements would then sit within each identified security aspect and be applied (where necessary) to parts of the UAS, e.g. ground based system (including the communications link) and the UA itself. The requirements must be ultimately traced to the overall policy requirements.
Security Process
4.9 Any agreed security design, evaluation and accreditation process will be integrated (where necessary) with the existing certification, approval and licensing processes utilized for manned aircraft.
4.10 The security design, evaluation and accreditation process will be considered as a factor to the operational scenario, including but not limited to:
-Applicable flight rules;
-Aircraft capabilities and performance including kinetic energy and lethal area;
-Operating environment (type of airspace, overflown population density);
-Opportunities for attack and desirability.
4.11 The operational scenarios, along with other applicable factors, must be combined with possible weaknesses to the system to determine a measure of perceived risk. A possible security lifecycle for the UAS is shown in Figure 1 and this particular phase is referred to as the risk assessment phase of the process.
4.12 Risk management techniques must then be utilized to reduce the perceived risk to an acceptable level of residual risk. As shown in Figure 1 this phase is referred to as the risk mitigation phase of the process.
4.13 The risk management techniques implemented are verified and evaluated for effectiveness in a regular cycle of ‘action and review’ ensuring optimum effectiveness is maintained throughout the lifecycle. As shown in Figure 1 this phase is referred to as the validation and verification phase of the process.
4.14 Although the approach above is directly applicable to technical security it must be borne in mind that this process must be supported by the application of both good physical security and procedural security and these could be drawn up by interactions between industry, the NCAA and Government agencies.
Current UAS Security Work
4.15 The current security research work draws on sector experience and recognized security standards. Through liaison with Government agencies, system security policies are formed that are not only thorough due to their holistic approach but also achievable due to the recognition that systems will have varying operational roles.
Scope
5.1 This chapter provides:
-guidance to industry on the NCAA’s policy on the use of frequencies to support UAS operations;
-guidance to industry on the assignment of frequencies in the absence of specifically identified UAS spectrum;
-guidance to industry with respect to current activities to progress the allocation of dedicated spectrum to support safety-critical UAS functionality (Command and Control / Detect and Avoid) through the relevant International Telecommunication Union (ITU) processes.
Introduction
5.2 The provision of a number of radio communication systems is essential to the safe and expeditious operation of UAS. The number and type of these radio communication systems vary according to the UAS application. A number of the safety-critical applications are already supported by existing aeronautical systems that operate in dedicated spectrum that ensures the appropriate level of protection.
5.3 However, the identification of suitable spectrum for certain UAS safety-critical systems, such as Command and Control, is still in its infancy and under further consideration by the ITU. During the World Radio communications Conference in 2012 (WRC 12), 61 MHz of additional terrestrial aeronautical safety spectrum was allocated in the frequency band 5030-5091 MHz; no additional spectrum was allocated for aeronautical satellite use, but the regulatory provisions pertaining to 150 MHz of aeronautical safety satellite spectrum in the frequency band 5000-5150 MHz were revised to ease access to the spectrum and increase protection. Further details will be published when clarified.
Aim
5.4 The aim of this policy statement is to clarify the position of the Authority in respect to how it expects the UAS industry to use spectrum and how it is prepared to assist in obtaining access to dedicated spectrum for safety-critical systems.
Policy
5.5 NCAA’s policy is:
-to ensure that frequencies used to support safety-critical UAS functionality meet both international and national regulations/legislation;
-to ensure that all frequencies used to support safety-critical UAS functionality have been coordinated and licensed in accordance with the appropriate licensing regime;
-to ensure that any such license obtained provides suitable protection to the use of that frequency appropriate to the functionality and safety criticality of the systems being supported and the area of operation;
-to assist in the identification of suitable dedicated spectrum to support UAS safety-critical functionality.
Assignment of Frequencies
5.6 The assignment of frequencies within Nigeria is the responsibility of Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC); however, in the bands below the responsibility is undertaken by the Authority on behalf of NCC:
-255 – 526.5 kHz Radio navigation
-108 – 137 MHz Radio navigation/Radio communications
-328.6 – 335.4 MHz Radio navigation
-960 – 1 350 MHz Radio navigation/Radar
-2 700 – 3 100 MHz Radar
-4 200 – 4 400 MHz Radio navigation
-5 000 – 5 150 MHz Radio navigation
-9 000 – 9 200 MHz Radar
-9 300 – 9 500 MHz Radar
5.7 Applications for the assignment of frequencies within the bands identified above must be addressed to the Authority. Applications for the use of frequency other than those listed above must be addressed to NCC. Of additional note is that any aircraft system transmitting on 1030 MHz, as may typically be used in collision warning or sense-and avoid systems, must not be operated without an approval from the Directorate of Aerodrome and Airspace Standards (DAAS), NCAA.
Allocation of Spectrum
5.8 The Authority supports the NCC by providing Nigeria’s lead on issues related to aeronautical spectrum, including UAS. For information on how to participate in the process for the identification and allocation of spectrum that can be used to support UAS operations contact the NCAA.
Use of 35 MHz, 2.4 GHz and 5.8GHz
5.9 There are no specific frequencies allocated for use by UAS in Nigeria. However, the most commonly found are 35 MHz, 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz.
5.10 35 MHz is a frequency designated for Model Aircraft use only, with the assumption that clubs and individuals will be operating in a known environment to strict channel allocation rules. It is therefore not considered to be a suitable frequency for UAS operations where the whereabouts of other users is usually difficult to assess.
5.11 2.4 GHz is a license free band used for car wireless keys, household internet and a wide range of other applications. Although this is considered to be far more robust to interference than 35 MHz, operators must act with appropriate caution in areas where it is expected that there will be a high degree of 2.4 GHz activity.
5.12 In addition, operations close to any facility that could cause interference (such as a radar station) could potentially disrupt communications with the UAS, whatever the frequency in use.
Scope
6.1 The registration requirements for civil UAS are contained in the Nig. CARs (Part 21) and are in line with the requirements of Part 4 of Nig. CARs 2015.
Policy
6.2 The registration requirements for unmanned aircraft are the same as for any other aircraft. The regulatory requirements are contained in Part 4 of Nig. CARs 2015.
6.3 UA with an operating mass in excess of 25 kg are required to be registered unless they are flying under an exemption. UA with an operating mass of more than 150 kg must be registered with the Authority. Once the Authority has processed the application, the aircraft will be issued with a registration ID consisting of five characters starting ‘5N’ (e.g. 5N-ABCD) and the details will be entered into the aircraft register. The registration must be displayed permanently on the aircraft in accordance with Part 4 of Nig. CARs 2015.
6.4 Nig. CARs requires most operators of aircraft, irrespective of the purposes for which they fly, to hold adequate levels of insurance in order to meet their liabilities in the event of an accident. Nig. CARs 2015 Part 4 specifies amongst other things the minimum levels of third party accident and war risk insurance for aircraft operating into, over or within the Nigeria (including UAS) depending on their MTOM.
6.5 Compliance monitoring of the insurance regulation is carried out by the Authority under the Directorate of Air Transport Regulations (DATR).
Scope
7.1 There have been no previous NCAA regulations governing the surveillance requirements for civil registered UAS in the Nigerian airspace. All civil aircraft fly subject to the legislation of Civil Aviation, 2006 and are regulated by the Nig. CARs. However, in accordance with its powers under the Nig. CARs, the Authority may exempt UAS operators from the provisions of the Regulations and the Rules of the Air, dependent upon the aircraft’s potential to inflict damage and injury. This policy is applicable to all civil UAS operating within the Nigeria Flight Information Region (FIR) and Upper Flight Information Region (UIR), regardless of origin.
Policy
7.2 This surveillance policy is complementary to the Detect and Avoid guidance contained in Section 3, Chapter 1. In broad terms, UAS must be able to interact with all other airspace users, regardless of the airspace or aircraft’s flight profile, in a manner that is transparent to all other airspace users and Air Navigation Service Providers (NAMA), when compared to manned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft must be interoperable with all surveillance systems without any additional workload for ATCOs, surveillance systems, manned aircraft pilots or other Remote Pilots. UAS must carry suitable equipment so as to be able to be interoperable with aircraft equipped with mandated Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) such as TCAS II. It must be noted that, where a UAS employs a collision avoidance system with reactive logic, any maneuver resulting from a perceived threat from another aircraft must not reduce the effectiveness of a TCAS II resolution advisory maneuver from that aircraft.
7.3 It is recognized that the Radar Cross Section (RCS) and size of certain categories of aircraft will make detection by noncooperative (Primary Surveillance Radar – PSR) surveillance systems difficult, especially at low-level. Consequently, cooperative ground and/or air based surveillance systems (Secondary Surveillance Radar- SSR) are traditionally deployed by NAMA to complement coverage of non-cooperative systems, especially in controlled airspace.
7.4 The primary means of cooperative surveillance within the Nigerian airspace is SSR Mode Select Elementary Surveillance (Mode S ELS). However, within certain areas of the Nigerian airspace, the carriage of an SSR transponder is not mandatory. In such airspace, where an Air Traffic Radar service is not mandatory, non-transponder equipped aircraft will not be ‘visible’ to ACAS. Consequently, in these areas ‘see and avoid’ is often the primary means of separation of aircraft. Therefore, until unmanned aircraft can comply with the ‘Detect and Avoid’ capabilities (Described in Section 2, Chapter 2) and the SSR carriage policy for such platforms can be reviewed, if necessary on a case-by-case basis, all UAS within non-segregated airspace must be equipped with, and be able to operate, an SSR Mode S transponder. The only exception to this rule is for UAS operating within Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) of the operator and staying below 400 ft for which a transponder is not required.
Source Documents
-NAMA AIP
-Part 14 of Nig. CARs 2015
-ICAO Annex 10 SARPs
Scope
1.1 This chapter offers guidance to industry on what aircraft certification is and how the activities associated with aircraft certification interrelate with the activities associated with continuing and continued airworthiness.
Lead Agency
1.2 In Nigeria, the regulatory framework is defined and enacted by the Nigerian Civil Aviation Regulations. The regulatory framework responsibilities address the following:
-Initial Airworthiness (certification and production)
-Continued and Continuing Airworthiness
-Operations
-Air Traffic Management
1.3 The regulatory framework and sharing of roles and responsibilities shall be described in the Nig. CARs. In very simple terms, NCAA is the primary agency for all rule making activities and conducting initial and continued airworthiness aspects.
1.4 It must be noted that within the Regulations certain aircraft categories are currently defined to be outside of scope and hence these aircraft remain subject to national regulation. This applies to aircraft carrying out military services or similar activities or services.
1.5 A number of exceptions to this are defined. With respect to UAS these are:
-Aircraft specifically designed or modified for research, experimental or scientific purposes and likely to be produced in very limited numbers;
-Unmanned aircraft with an operating mass of 150kg or less.
Policy
1.6 The following text provides an overview of the objectives of the airworthiness and certification processes and is intended to give a general understanding of the various aspects of civil certification and the related organizational oversight activities. It is not a complete or detailed explanation of this complex subject.
1.7 Whilst UAS of 150 kg and below are not normally required to undergo formal airworthiness certification, the principles outlined in this Chapter apply to all UAS operations.
Certification Objectives
1.8 Under cover of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (commonly referred to as the “Chicago Convention” (ICAO Doc. 7300)) there is a system of internationally agreed standards and recommended practices by which each contracting state can establish a means to ensure a minimum level of safety is established and achieved, thus enabling mutual recognition of individual aircraft operating within each other’s airspace.
1.9 As not all types of aviation require routine international operating capability, each state can define and establish their own standards and practices for these national activities. In Nigeria, this has for most aircraft types, been harmonized across states as described above.
1.10 Therefore, it is important to recognize that the headline title of airworthiness/ certification is a means by which the Authority can establish and attest to compliance with an agreed set of standards. These standards cover the necessary range of aircraft types and the activities to be undertaken; typically the standards applied can be, and usually are, different for varying classes of aircraft and their intended use. For example:
To comply with the ICAO international requirements aircraft must be operated under cover of an Operational Approval; each aircraft must have a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (which is underpinned by an approved Type Design) and be flown by appropriately qualified and licensed flight crew.
1.11 At the other end of manned aviation small personal use (recreational) aircraft may have an Authorization to Fly, which as a National approval, limits use to that country and could include limitations and conditions on where and when it can be flown (e.g. class of airspace, weather conditions, etc). It must also be noted that a National approval is just that, so precludes automatic rights of use/operation in another country; this does not prevent use or operation in another country but it does mean each state will need to determine how and what it will allow by separate process.
1.12 Thus, certification is a process by which the capability and operational limits of an aircraft are determined.
Initial, Continuing and Continued Airworthiness
1.13 Within the certification and airworthiness system there are three basic processes to set and maintain required standards. These processes determine and maintain the intended level of safety:
-Initial airworthiness processes;
-Continuing airworthiness processes;
-Continued airworthiness processes.
1.14 The initial airworthiness processes are those used to determine the applicable requirements, and establish that an aircraft design is demonstrated to be able to meet these requirements. This includes the safety targets and the development of instructions for use and ongoing care/maintenance. In Nigeria, the framework which is adopted would also cover the elements of production, i.e. those aspects of taking the approved design and manufacturing the end product to the point of a useable aircraft. This phase is therefore complete prior to an aircraft entering into service.
1.15 The continuing airworthiness process refers to the system of management of the aircraft and the scheduling and actioning of ongoing preventative and corrective maintenance to confirm correct functioning and to achieve safe, reliable and cost effective operation.
1.16 Continued airworthiness refers to the monitoring, reporting and corrective action processes used for in-service aircraft to assure they maintain the appropriate safety standard defined during the initial airworthiness processes throughout their operational life.
1.17 In parallel with each of these processes, there are schemes that require or provide for organization approvals, e.g. design, production, maintenance and organization approvals. These approvals enable the NCAA to recognize capability within a company system; this limits the level of investigation and oversight that may be necessary to establish compliance against the regulatory standards applicable to individual products.
Initial Airworthiness Processes
1.18 The initial airworthiness process is intended to establish a desired level of airworthiness integrity for an aircraft and to demonstrate that this level of integrity can be achieved. In this case, integrity can be taken to include all aspects of the design (structurally and systemically) to cover safety, reliability, availability, capability, etc. When the desired level of airworthiness integrity is met and consistently shown to be achieved, the aircraft can be considered to provide an acceptable level of safety; this covers both the vehicle (and any person(s) on board, if applicable) and, by inference from continued safe flight, to persons and property on the ground.
1.19 The initial airworthiness processes have the following basic elements for design and production:
-Establishment of the design/certification requirements (certification specifications) which define the high level design criteria and showing that these are met.
-The design organization aspects which covers the capability and competence of the company for the design of the complete aircraft, systems or individual parts.
-The production organization aspects which cover the capability and competence for the manufacture and assembly of the complete aircraft, systems or individual parts in accordance with the approved design and testing of the aircraft prior to delivery.
1.20 The design organization is charged with demonstrating to the certification authority that the proposed design is compliant with the established and agreed certification specifications or other requirements. Similarly the production organization is responsible to show the end product is in conformance to the design.
1.21 For current categories of aircraft there are already established design/certification requirements, such as the EASA Certification Specifications (e.g. Large Aeroplanes (CS-25), Large Rotorcraft (CS-29), Very Light Aircraft (CS-VLA), and Very Light Rotorcraft (CS-VLR)). These also provide guidance material on the intent of the requirement and methods of showing compliance that have been found to be acceptable. However, it is recognized that these do not fully address the range of aircraft potentially possible, how the technology elements pertinent to UAS may cross the boundaries between the categories of the requirements, or indeed what would be considered appropriate for aircraft of mass below 150 kg.
1.22 Except for the very smallest aircraft, where the safety aspect is controlled by separation and operational management, each class of aircraft will have some level of safety requirement. At the highest end, where a formal certification approval is necessary, this safety assessment requirement for “Equipment, Systems and Installations” and the associated guidance material is already defined in the Certification Specifications under paragraph CSXX.1309. However, once again this may not be wholly appropriate for all categories of aircraft.
Continuing airworthiness processes
1.23 The continuing airworthiness processes are intended to assure that in–service aircraft are managed and maintained and that these actions are performed correctly, by appropriately capable persons, in accordance with the instructions developed by the design organization so that assumptions and considerations made during the design, particularly in respect of safety, remain valid. As a result, these processes also need effective communication between the operator, maintenance organizations and the design organizations to ensure that necessary information is shared and if necessary corrective actions taken.
1.24 The continuing airworthiness process will support any modifications, repair or component replacement once an aircraft has entered service. This is achieved by not only undertaking the incorporation of the changes, but also in the management of configuration records, updating of maintenance instructions, etc.
Continued airworthiness processes
1.25 The continued airworthiness processes are intended to provide a closed loop monitor and corrective action cycle for in-service aircraft to assure that the intended level of safety is maintained. The process starts with activity within the certification work (for example the development of the maintenance schedules and instructions on how to perform this activity). Thereafter, it includes the monitoring of experience of in-service aircraft and, when necessary, the definition and promulgation of corrective action instructions.
1.26 The development of maintenance schedules typically considers and uses information from the aircraft design and safety assessment processes to determine what maintenance activities are required and how frequently they will be performed to maintain the appropriate level of aircraft integrity (for example replacing parts before they would typically wear out or fail will prevent the consequence of this and hence aid both safety and commercial costs).
1.27 The monitoring and reporting processes support the collection and analysis of inservice information and enable the design organization to be satisfied that the overall level of safety is being achieved, or if necessary, to determine and promulgate corrective actions to address problem areas.
1.28 If these programs are run correctly, they have the potential to save organizations money – it is usually cheaper in terms of both money and time to fix a minor problem before it becomes a serious problem.
Scope
2.1 This chapter offers guidance on the general certification requirements for UAS, where this is applicable.
Policy
2.2 The approach taken by the Authority for certification is described below. Within this process the actual requirements that make up the certification basis, which must be shown to be met, may well be different for each State due to the views, experience and concerns of each country.
Applicability
2.3 Aircraft over 150kg needs to be certificated by the Authority and hence reference to them must be made.
2.4 Aircraft of 150kg or less are subject to national regulation and hence the information and guidance provided in this document applies.
2.5 The Authority process and requirements that will be applied for the certification of UAS, where certification is appropriate, is described below.
Certification Process
2.6 The initial airworthiness or “Type Certification” process can be considered to follow a simple flow line, albeit there may be parallel paths with obtaining of Design Organization and Production Organization Approval, where these are necessary, which must come together at key cross-contact points.
2.7 The following describes the typical process for aircraft of 150kg and above.
Phase 0: Company develops idea to point of maturity where certification is considered appropriate or necessary. During this phase the company will need to consider both functional requirements (to derive a product that is capable of performing what is intended) and also the external requirements that may need to be met (certification, operational, legislative, environmental etc.). It may also include the building and testing of initial developmental and prototype machines.
Phase 1: Application is made to the Authority to begin the certification process. At this point the formal process begins which enables two things:
-The applicable certification requirements are defined as those published at this date. Compliance with these requirements must be demonstrated within five years. If this is not achieved, later published revisions to the requirements may be introduced.
-The initial or general familiarization of the product begins, this enables the Authority to begin to review the applicable specific requirements set and notify/confirm this to the company and to determine the technical areas that will require specialist involvement in the project.
Phase 2: Detail or technical familiarization leading to the agreement of the certification requirements set – the certification basis. In this phase the company briefs the Authority specialists on the detailed design, the requirements that they have considered applicable and how these are planned to be demonstrated as being met – the means or method of compliance. The Authority specialist team considers these proposals and, following further discussion with the applicant, an agreed certification basis is documented. This basis will usually start from one (or more) of the existing Certification Specifications from which unnecessary items will be deleted. Additions may be introduced to cover where the requirement is inadequate or there are no suitable requirements due to the new or novel technologies used. For simple designs these phases can be covered as one.
Phase 3: The Company works to demonstrate compliance with the Certification Basis in the agreed way. If necessary further dialogue is held to ensure that the most effective ways of working are used to agree changes in the means/methods of compliance, or indeed to revise the requirements if changes to the original design are made and warrant this.
Phase 4: Compliance has been shown. The NCAA team will complete their report and recommend issuance of the aircraft type design approval, which is recorded by the Type Certificate and the associated Type Certificate Data Sheet. These define the aircraft type, high level features, the certification basis met, applicable maintenance, inspection and operational instructions, key limitations, restrictions and conditions and other necessary information that form the approved design.
2.8 For aircraft of 150kg and below, the current NCAA approach is not to mandate airworthiness certification as outlined above but to make use of the UAS Operating Safety Case process. However it is considered worth noting that elements of the safety case must reflect similar information to that which would be developed within the certification process. It is therefore considered that a level of understanding of the certification requirements may therefore be useful and maybe beneficial in designing the aircraft, even though not required by the regulatory system.
Certification Basis
2.9 From the above processes the derivation of the applicable requirements is clearly a key aspect. However, it is clear that the current requirements set do not align with the types/size/mass of aircraft that are being developed as UAS.
2.10 Unfortunately, the timeline for developing requirements is likely always to be behind the rate of technological advancement. The current approach is therefore to identify the category that fits as best as possible to the type/classification of the aircraft – and subtract what is not necessary and add to fill the gaps where required. The gaps can be filled by parts of other requirement sets, where practicable, and/or by developing new material where necessary.
For example: a simple fixed wing aeroplane design may align well with the VLA (Very Light Aeroplanes) category with respect to structure and control surface actuation etc. However, because of the remote pilot aspects, the design may have a sophisticated command and flight control system, which is not addressed in CS-VLA. Use of the relevant sections of CS-23 or even CS-25 may be applicable.
2.11 The main difficulty with this approach, apart from the commercial risk prior to agreement with the Authority, is the potential lack of cohesion between the safety target levels from the different standards.
Interrelationship between the Three Stages of Airworthiness Oversight
Initial and Continued Airworthiness
2.12 During the initial certification of an aircraft the initial and continued airworthiness processes may be considered to run concurrently, as the information developed within the initial airworthiness processes feeds into the continued airworthiness processes to develop the “instructions for continued airworthiness”, i.e. the maintenance schedules and tasks which need to reflect the assumptions and considerations of use of the aircraft.
2.13 In principle, the intent is that once it has been demonstrated both the initial airworthiness and continued airworthiness requirements have been met, an aircraft type will be issued with a Type Certificate.
2.14 Type Certificates are only issued to the following:
-Aircraft
-Engines
-APUs
-Propellers
2.15 The development of all other types of aircraft system is required to be overseen by the Type Certificate applicant.
2.16 Once an aircraft, engine, APU or propeller holds a Type Certificate any changes will fall in to the following categories:
-Major Change – This is a significant change to the design of an aircraft, engine, propeller or related system that is designed and implemented by the holder of the Type Certificate.
-Supplemental Type Certificate – This is a significant change to the design of an aircraft, engine or propeller that is not designed and implemented by the holder of the relevant Type Certificate.
-Minor Change – This is a non-significant change to the design of an aircraft, engine, propeller or related system which is not permitted to affect the extant aircraft, engine or propeller level safety assumptions.
-Change in Operational Use – This is a change to the operational use of an aircraft, engine or propeller that falls outside the agreed scope of use defined during the initial and continued airworthiness processes. In principle this must be discussed and agreed with the relevant TC holder but this is not actually mandated.
2.17 Clearly any change to a certificated system that does not involve the TC holder has potential implications for aviation safety.
Continuing Airworthiness
2.18 The continuing airworthiness process begins with an evaluation of an organization to determine whether or not it meets the basic requirements to be allowed to perform initial and/or continued airworthiness functions.
2.19 This process seeks to determine compliance against one or more of a number of organizational approval requirements documents:
-Part 5 – “Certification of Aircraft and Related Products, Parts and Appliances, and of Design and Production Organization”. In simple terms this document applies to organizations involved in initial airworthiness.
-Part 5 – “Continuing Airworthiness Requirements”. This relates to organizations that are responsible for managing and overseeing maintenance tasks and maintenance scheduling.
-Part 5 – “Approved Maintenance Organizations”. This applies to organizations that perform continued airworthiness related tasks under the management of an organization approved to Part 5.
-Part 2 – “Maintenance Training Organizational Approvals”. This applies to organizations that are responsible for the provision of aviation related training.
-Part 2 – “Certifying Staff”. This documents the competency requirements for personnel that are responsible for signing off aircraft or aircraft systems as serviceable.
2.20 No organization is permitted to work within the aviation industry unless they either have the relevant approvals, as dictated by the continuing airworthiness processes or they are overseen by an organisation that holds the relevant approval. This is intended to ensure that any aviation work is performed with a degree of integrity commensurate to the risk associated with that activity. Once an approval has been granted, the continuing airworthiness process runs concurrently with the initial and continued airworthiness processes to ensure that an appropriate level of organizational integrity is maintained to support the individual project/aircraft level tasks overseen by the initial and continued airworthiness processes.
2.21 If the initial and/or continued airworthiness processes identify organizational risks, this information is passed back in to the continuing airworthiness processes to ensure that these risks are managed appropriately
Scope
3.1 This chapter offers guidance to industry on the level of certification required for each UAS type. Where no formal airworthiness certification is required guidance is given on the approach to take.
Policy
3.2 The level of certification required for an aircraft or UAS is based upon the intended use.
3.3 As described in Chapter 2 of this Section, at the highest level there are aircraft that have a Certificate of Airworthiness underpinned by Type Certification, continued and continuing airworthiness processes and design and production organization approvals. These aircraft are flown by rated and licensed pilots under the procedures of an approved operator and thus are capable for international operations under the mutual recognition arrangements from ICAO and the International Convention.
3.4 At the opposite end of the spectrum, we have aircraft that are not required to hold any airworthiness approvals but can be operated commercially under cover of an operating authorization provided they are suitably separated from third parties and property.
3.5 Compliance with the most demanding requirements provides for a widest range of operational privileges, whereas a lack of demonstrable airworthiness can still be accommodated – but with significant restrictions on the operations where appropriate.
3.6 This approach is intended to provide a reasonable and proportionate level of regulation. This is based on the scale and level of risk each category of aircraft and its use could pose to both the general public and their property, whether on the ground or in an aircraft. The challenge therefore is to match the operational aspirations, and the risk this could pose, with proportionate airworthiness requirements that provide adequate management of this risk.
Aircraft Classification
3.7 The current framework established and used by the Authority classifies aircraft based on simple discriminates or type (e.g. balloon, fixed or rotary wing) and mass. This reflects the historic developments in manned aviation – but is not necessarily fully appropriate for UAS. However, until such time as alternative classification protocols are agreed this system is in place. Working within this means we have very simple categorizations.
3.8 UA of mass greater than 150kg fall within the remit of NCAA Regulation, unless they are State aircraft.
3.9 Below 150kg the current assumption is that certification is a fully national process and hence, will automatically be considered for the Authority’s operational use only.
Aircraft between 25kg and 150kg:
3.10 For this class of aircraft, the approach taken is based on no formal airworthiness/certification of the aircraft, but an increasing degree of scrutiny of the aircraft design, construction techniques, operational safety management processes and pilot competencies. This will need to be robustly documented in a Safety Case type report (i.e. UAS OSC).
3.11 As such, the onus is placed on the operator to understand and describe not just the aircraft design and its capabilities, but also the potential failures of the aircraft and its control systems, the consequence and severity of these and how they are to be mitigated or managed for the operations to be undertaken.
3.12 The intent remains that the more complex the aircraft and the more risk posed by the type of operation, the more robust and comprehensive the safety case will need to be.
3.13 As such, whilst the requirements may not apply, it is recommended that the higher the mass, or the more complex and more capable the aircraft, the more an organization must refer to the airworthiness requirements that would apply to the next category of aircraft as this could provide useful information on the types of information to be addressed within the safety case.
Aircraft below 25kg:
3.14 For this class of aircraft, if conducting aerial work or operating close to third parties or property, the approach is that no airworthiness/certification of the aircraft is required provided that the pilot is capable to safely fly the aircraft, the type of operation can be undertaken within VLOS, within the defined areas of segregation (400ft altitude, 500m radius) and an operating authorization is obtained from the NCAA. In the same way as for UAS of 150kg and below, the UAS OSC approach is applied. For SUA with a mass of 7kg or less, a full OSC is not normally required for a “standard” authorization to operate at least 50m clear of third parties.
3.15 Where aircraft of less than 25kg are used purely for recreational purposes, away from third party people or property, the NCAA does not impose any regulatory burden. However, whether conducting aerial work or operating for recreational purposes, it is always the responsibility of the pilot to ensure that the use of the aircraft does not pose a threat to any other person, property or aircraft.
Scope
4.1 This chapter offers guidance on some general safety assessment issues for UAS Certification.
Policy
4.2 The intent of a Safety Assessment is to demonstrate that the aircraft is safe enough for the manner and type of operation it is intended to perform. It is not intended here to describe any of the many different types of assessment or analyses that can be undertaken, but to outline the basic aspects to be considered.
4.3 It is important however to recognize that Safety Assessments, if conducted as a fundamental and iterative design process, can provide benefits in terms of the level of safety achievable. This also achieves a degree of reliability or availability possible and even minimize the cost of ownership through effective maintenance schedules.
4.4 If the Safety Assessment is considered simply as a retrospective analysis the result can only reflect the frozen design. Whilst this could be sufficient, it does also carry the risk that any shortfall can only be addressed by redesign or by limitations or restrictions on the use – which could be significant enough to preclude viable operation.
Assessment Steps
4.5 A Safety Assessment may be considered in simple steps:
-Determination of the set of aircraft level threats/hazards related to functional failures are identified;
-The severity of the consequence for each of these failure conditions is determined/classified;
-This classification could be different for differing scenarios, e.g. during different phases of flight;
-The target level of safety (TLOS) is assigned for each failure condition;
-The systems and component failures that could contribute to each of these failure conditions is assessed or analyzed to establish if the individual TLOS is met Compliance with each individual failure condition and the overall aircraft level target is shown;
4.6 Within the airworthiness requirements set, as discussed below, the large aircraft certification specifications contain specific requirements and levels of safety defined in probability terms. For smaller classes of aircraft the airworthiness requirements may not define levels of safety to this detail – hence the method of demonstrating compliance is open for discussion and may be able to be based on judgement and justified arguments rather than detailed probabilistic analysis. This is clearly important as with lower levels of robust component reliability data the more challenging is the task of developing probability analyses.
Safety Assessment Considerations
4.7 Each of the UAS design requirement sets will include system safety requirements. These are often referred to as System Safety Objectives or Requirement Criteria. This requires that the probability of a failure is inversely proportional to the severity of its effect at aircraft level, i.e. high criticality systems are required to have an extremely low probability of failure.
4.8 These certification requirements were established many years ago based on inservice experience (accident data etc) and a desire to set a standard that would drive improvements in what was then being achieved. For each class of passenger transport aircraft (large and small fixed wing aircraft, rotorcraft, etc.), an acceptable fatal accident rate was defined, e.g. 1 accident in 10 million flight hours (10-7 per flight hour), for a large fixed wing aircraft.
4.9 Then based on simple assumptions regarding the number of aircraft systems and potentially critical failures in each of these, a target level of safety was defined for each critical failure. This is described in detail within the advisory material that goes with the requirement.
4.10 The validity of using these probability targets for UAS is currently a debated subject. Clearly, they relate to passenger transport aircraft and the safety of passengers carried. However, it must be noted that by protecting persons on board an aircraft, third parties on the ground will also be protected.
4.11 There is also some discussion that the types of operation undertaken by passenger aircraft is quite different to the range of operations undertaken by UAS, hence once again the probability targets are inappropriate. In respect to this, it must be noted that the safety assessment process already accounts for this to some extent, as due to these differences the consequence or severity of effect could be quite different thus giving a different target level of safety.
4.12 For UAS, the safety assessment and any analysis or justification to demonstrate compliance with the level of safety target is primarily based on the aircraft system and its associated failure mechanisms. The aircraft system is the total system required for safe flight and landing, e.g. the aircraft, control station, command and control datalinks and any launch or landing/recovery systems.
4.13 In principle, it does not place reliance on external factors that may mitigate the failure – these are the safety nets that could prevent the worst case scenario.
4.14 It must also be noted that where the simple assumptions made in the certification safety assessment requirements are not valid, e.g. independent versus integrated systems, simple versus complex and the number of critical failure conditions, it may be necessary to impose more stringent targets to individual failure conditions in order to meet the aircraft target level of safety.
4.15 For aircraft of 150kg or less the proportionate approach taken does not require a safety assessment to the level described above. However, the safety case approach does still require consideration of the hazards (including those that could be due to aircraft system failures), their severity, and justification of how these will be mitigated and managed. It is therefore envisaged that some level of assessment and justification of how and why hazards are suitably managed will be necessary, albeit not to the level that uses detail probability based analyses.
Other Considerations
4.16 The value of the safety assessment process in the development of maintenance programs, e.g. the type and frequency of maintenance actions, must also be recognized. The outputs of the processes provide useful data to determine what maintenance activities are required and how frequently they will be performed to maintain the appropriate level of aircraft integrity. These maintenance actions can prevent critical failures, e.g. by replacing items before they are likely to fail, or by detecting problems before operation of the aircraft. Not only does this support safety but it has the potential to save money – it is usually cheaper in terms of both money and time to fix a minor problem before it becomes a serious problem.
Introduction
1.1 The purpose of this Chapter is to outline the policies, constraints and regulations that are to be adhered to when conducting UAS operations within Nigerian airspace.
1.2 The legal constraints on flying operations, including UAS, within Nigerian airspace are contained within the Nig. CARs and it must be noted that the use of Danger Areas (DAs) for the segregation of RPAS activities might be subject to specific regulations pertinent to the DA. Information on airspace regulation within DAs must therefore be sought from the relevant Danger Area authority. NAMA AIP will assist in identifying the appropriate authority if required.
1.3 Whilst the segregation of UAS from other airspace users provides a safe operating environment, the process for establishing such airspace reduces the flexibility of operation sought by the user community. This Chapter does not cover reactions to unplanned/emergency situations, as these are already catered for by the use of Restricted Area (Temporary) (RA(T)) and Emergency Restriction of Flying (ERF) procedures.
Scope
1.4 The guidance below details the operating principles associated with UAS flights both in segregated and non-segregated airspace. Specific regulations for model aircraft are detailed in NCAA-GAD-AC-005, Model Aircraft: General Safety Practices for Model Aircraft.
Policy
1.5 There is no lower weight limit below which the Nig. CARs 2019 does not apply; however, the extent to which the regulations apply depends upon the mass of the aircraft. Part 21 of Nig. CARs 2019 defines constraints that are unique to small unmanned aircraft and small unmanned surveillance aircraft. Some of these constraints are dependent upon whether the aircraft exceeds 7 kg or if it is used for the purpose of aerial work or surveillance. Part 21 of Nig. CARs 2019 applies to all weight categories and stipulates that any person operating an aircraft must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property (which includes other aircraft and their occupants). If the Authority believes that danger may be caused, then the Authority may direct that the aircraft must not be flown.
Airspace Principles for UAS Operations in Nigeria.
1.7 The Civil Aviation Act is designed to enable the safe and efficient operation of manned aircraft in all classes of airspace. UAS operators must work within the same regulatory framework.
1.8 UAS do not have an automatic right to airspace if safety provision cannot be made or if such operations would have an unreasonably negative impact on other airspace users. In order to integrate with other airspace users, UAS operators must ensure that their aircraft can demonstrate an equivalent level of compliance with the rules and procedures that apply to manned aircraft. As such, the routine flight of any UAS outside DAs or non-segregated airspace cannot be permitted to increase the risk to existing users.
1.9 Until UAS can comply with the requirements of the Part 21 of Nig. CARs 2019 and the Rules of the Air Regulations (Part 14 of Nig. CARs 2015), one-off or occasional UAS flights outside DAs may be accommodated through the establishment of Temporary Danger Areas (TDAs). TDAs must not be considered to be a convenient ‘catch all’ for short notice UAS activities that can simply be requested, and implemented, without due consideration for other airspace users. TDAs will mainly be used for longer term measures, where activities have been properly planned and prepared, and adequate time is available for full consideration by NAMA’s NOTAM requirements along with full promulgation. TDAs are covered more fully below.
1.10 Unless special provision is made with the Air Traffic Service Unit (ATSU) handling the UAS activity, the provision of an Air Traffic Service (ATS) to an unmanned aircraft must be transparent to the controller. In other words, the controller must not have to do anything different using radiotelephony or landlines than he would for other aircraft under his control, nor must he have to apply different rules or work to different criteria. The following points are of note:
-UAS must be able to comply with instructions from the ATS provider and with equipment requirements applicable to the class of airspace within which they intend to operate. ATS instructions must also be complied with in a timescale comparable with that of a manned aircraft.
-All UAS call signs must include the word “UNMANNED”, on first contact with the ATS provider, to ensure that air traffic controllers are fully aware that they are dealing with a UAS flight. If “special provisions” are made with the associated ATSU, it is essential that these do not reduce the situational awareness of other airspace users.
General Principles for Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Operations outside Segregated Airspace
1.11 For all flights outside DAs or segregated airspace, the aircraft performance and all communications with the ATS provider must be continuously monitored by the UAS Commander and/or its pilot. To comply with ATS instructions in a timescale comparable with that of a manned aircraft, it is imperative that the capability of taking immediate active control of the aircraft exists at all times.
1.12 Special equipment (e.g. Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Transponder) mandated for manned aircraft in certain classifications of airspace (For example flight above 10,000ft within Class G airspace or flight within a Transponder Mandatory Zone) must also be mandated as a minimum requirement for UAS intending to fly in such airspace.
1.13 An approved method of assuring terrain clearance is required.
1.14 Standard Operating Procedures are required and these would normally be contained within an organization’s UAS Operations Manual. As a minimum, the following procedures must be covered:
-Take-off and landing procedures;
-En-route procedures;
-Loss of control data link; and
-Abort procedures following critical system failure.
1.15 UAS must comply with the Instrument or Visual Flight Rules (IFR or VFR).
1.16 Additional safety requirements that will be considered under authorizations and exemptions may include that the aircraft must not be flown:
-Unless it is equipped with a mechanism that will cause the aircraft to land in the event of disruption to or a failure of any of its control systems, including the radio link, and the person in charge of the aircraft has satisfied himself that such mechanism is in working order before the aircraft commences its flight;
-Unless the person in charge of the aircraft has reasonably satisfied himself that any load carried by the aircraft is properly secured, that the aircraft is in an airworthy condition and that the flight can safely be made. Operators and manufacturers who are in any doubt as to the airworthiness of their system must seek independent assessment from either the NCAA or an appropriate NCAA-approved qualified entity.
Detect and Avoid
1.17 An approved method of aerial collision avoidance is required thus UAS operations will not be permitted in non-segregated airspace, outside the direct unaided visual line-of-sight of the pilot, without an acceptable Detect and Avoid system.
Note: The use of ‘First Person View R/C’ equipment (FPV R/C is a system whereby a radio control model aircraft is piloted by using a live video downlink from an on-board camera allowing the pilot to experience a ‘cockpit view’ and to control the aircraft from the visual perspective of that camera. The live video is normally displayed to the pilot through ‘video goggles’ worn on the pilot’s head or through a stand-alone monitor.) is not considered to be acceptable for use as a Detect and Avoid solution.
1.18 If the system does not have an approved Detect and Avoid capability, the restrictions detailed below will normally be applied to UAS operations outside segregated airspace as part of the NCAA authorizations and exemptions process. The aircraft must not be flown:
-In controlled airspace, except with the authorization of the appropriate ATC unit;
-In any aerodrome traffic zone except with the authorization of either the appropriate ATC unit or the person in charge of the aerodrome;
-At a height exceeding 400 feet above the surface;
-At a distance beyond the visual range of the Remote Pilot/RPA observer of the aircraft, or a maximum range of 500 meters, whichever is less.
1.19 Where available, the operator is to make use of an ATS provider to monitor UAS flights and to provide a service to them and to other aircraft operating in the vicinity of the segregated airspace. Communications are to be maintained between the ATS provider and the Remote Pilot, and procedures are to be put in place for, amongst others, emergency recovery, loss of control link and the avoidance of infringing aircraft.
1.20 Unless able to comply with the current requirements of the ANO, including the Rules of the Air, UAS flights which are operated beyond the visual line of sight of the pilot are required to be contained within segregated airspace. The uses DAs as the primary method of airspace segregation for UAS operations. It is recognized, however, that there may be occasions when UAS flights are planned to take place outside an established DA; in these cases, TDAs could be established to provide the appropriate segregation.
Temporary Danger Areas Maximum Duration
1.21 Although the use of TDAs offers a flexible tool for segregating specific portions of airspace on a temporary basis, it is important to emphasize that segregation effectively denies airspace to otherwise legitimate users.
1.22 Due to their ‘temporary’ nature, TDAs will normally only be established to cover RPAS activities up to a maximum period of 90 days. The formation of a TDA must not be viewed as a convenient means of establishing segregated airspace for routine, long-term activities; however, such requests will continue to be subject to the Airspace Change Process. TDAs will not be routinely ‘reissued’ to cover periods beyond their original lifespan.
Application Requirements
1.23 Requests for the establishment of TDAs to support UAS operations are to be forwarded to NCAA Airspace Regulation. In order to allow time for the appropriate approval and notification to take place, a minimum of 90 days notice is required. In cases where larger volumes of segregated airspace are required, particularly when the airspace extends to higher altitudes, an extended notification period may need to be stipulated. Applications with less than 90 days notice may be considered, but will be taken on a case-by-case basis and any approval/rejection decision will be largely biased towards the likely potential for impact on other airspace users. Applications must contain the following information:
-A clear description of the requirement for the TDA;
-Details of the volume of airspace required, including coordinates;
-Details of the required hours of operation;
-Details of the airspace management procedures that will be employed (ATC, Flexible Use of Airspace practices, NOTAM procedures, etc.);
-Details of the TDA Sponsor;
-Details of the consultation that has taken place;
-Details of the type(s) of Remotely Piloted Aircraft that will be flown within the airspace, in particular the status of any airworthiness approvals/exemptions.
TDA Sponsorship
1.24 The requirement for sponsorship of a TDA is identical to that required for any other DA.
Decision/Approval
1.25 The decision on whether or not to approve the establishment of a TDA rests with the Director, Directorate of Aerodrome and Airspace Standards (DAAS).
Implementation
1.26 Planned TDAs will normally be implemented and promulgated to airspace users via NAMA Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). In cases where there is insufficient time left to promulgate a TDA via the normal AIP method, full details of the TDA will be issued via a detailed Notice to Airman (NOTAM). In addition, a document containing text and a diagram in a similar format to the AIP will be placed within the ‘News’ section on the Home page of the NAMA AIS website.
General Principles for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations inside Segregated Airspace
1.27 For flights within segregated airspace, whilst some of the restrictions detailed at paragraph 1.18 may still apply, a remotely piloted aircraft will generally be given freedom of operation within the bounds of the allocated airspace, subject to any agreed procedures and safety requirements. An approval to operate will take into account the risks associated with any unintended excursion from the allocated airspace and it will also consider the possibility of airspace infringements. In addition, measures that may be put in place to enhance the safety of UAS activities will also be considered in the approval process.
1.28 While segregated airspace, by its nature, provides exclusive use of that airspace to the UAS activity, boundaries are not impervious to aircraft infringements. In order to enhance the safety of RPAS operations the following constraints may be imposed:
-Where available, the operator is to make use of an ATS provider to monitor UAS flights and to provide a service to them and to other aircraft operating in the vicinity of the segregated airspace;
-Communications are to be maintained between the ATS provider and the Remote Pilot;
-Procedures are to be put in place for, amongst others, emergency recovery, loss of control link and the avoidance of infringing aircraft.
SUA Operating in Controlled Airspace and Aerodrome Traffic Zones
1.29 Port Harcourt International Airport, for example, exert a major influence over the characteristics of Port Harcourt airspace and often require that any aircraft operating low-level Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights adhere to notified routes and procedures to avoid traffic conflict. This is particularly true of VFR helicopter flights in and around Port Harcourt, which are often under active control and confined to a route-structure with changing altitude limitations. Information on this low-level VFR helicopter route structure is provided by the Delta Operators Group in Port Harcourt.
1.30 Due to their small size and ability to operate out of small sites in towns and cities, SUA are particularly difficult to see against an urban backdrop versus the relatively much larger size of a manned aircraft. The majority of SUA do not have an anti-collision beacon (although they may have other lights of lesser illumination – typically LEDs) and they are not currently required to be fitted with a transponder. The small size and the open-framework, symmetrical structure of a multi-rotor SUA means that it may not be clearly visible until at a much closer distance than would be the case between two manned aircraft, particularly when the SUA is hovering or moving slowly. Sighting of a SUA from another aircraft is likely to be a ‘late sighting’ with reduced time to alter course.
1.31 Therefore, in addition to maintaining direct VLOS and, where required, keeping to a height of no more than 400 feet above the surface, operators of SUA of any weight must avoid and give way to manned aircraft at all times. SUA must not fly higher than 300 feet when operating directly below the Port Harcourt Helicopter routes, whether on land or over the rivers. Any flight directly below the helicopter routes must obtain a Non-Standard Flight (NSF) approval prior to flight.
1.32 In addition to the helicopter route structure and information on Port Harcourt Control Zone, the AIP also includes data and charts for Port Harcourt NAF Base. The Port Harcourt NAF Base Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ) comprises a 5 NM circle from the surface to 2,000 feet and has an associated Local Flying Area (LFA) to the south from the surface up to 2,500 feet. The airspace dedicated to Port Harcourt NAF Base may well cover areas where SUA wish to fly including the area around Port Harcourt Traffic Zone.
1.33 Whether operating within Port Harcourt Controlled Airspace, or in other Delta areas of Controlled Airspace (including any ATZ), pilots of SUA in the mass range between above 7 kg and 25 kg must obtain a prior NSF approval from the appropriate Air Traffic Services (ATS) unit. For SUA of any mass, a further Enhanced NSF (ENSF) approval is required for flight in certain restricted areas. The NSF approval process is a mandatory preparatory action and, even when approval has been given, SUA operators must establish contact with the appropriate ATS unit on the actual day of operation. At such time, the SUA operator will normally be given a tactical clearance to operate within the limits of their pre-existing NSF approval and advice and information may be provided on the local air situation. This does not absolve the operator from the responsibility for avoiding all other aircraft.
1.34 NOTAM action at each site is generally not required due to the typically small scale, duration and operating limitations of SUA operations. Such a requirement must, however, form part of the operator’s risk assessment process, particularly outside of controlled airspace and when several SUA will be operating together (‘swarming’).
1.35 Under the new Nig. CARs Regulations, operators of SUA with a mass of 7 kg or less are required to gain a NSF approval from Air Traffic Control (ATC) to operate within Class A, C, D or E airspace or within an active ATZ. However Part 21 of Nig. CARs 2019 states that a person in charge of a SUA ‘may only fly the aircraft if reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made’ and that they ‘must maintain direct, unaided visual contact with the aircraft for the purpose of avoiding collisions’. In practical terms, SUA of any mass could present a particular hazard when operating near an aerodrome or other landing site due to the presence of manned aircraft taking off and landing. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that contact with the relevant ATS unit is made prior to conducting such a flight. Advice and information may be provided on the local air situation that will help the operator satisfy themselves that the flight can safely be made. Such information provided by the ATS unit does not constitute or infer an approval to operate in the airspace and does not absolve the operator from the responsibility for avoiding all other aircraft. Contact details for aerodromes and ATS units can be found in NAMA’s AIP publications.
1.36 Operators of any SUA of mass 7 kg or less, are strongly advised for collision avoidance purposes, to remain clear of charted aerodromes by at least a distance of 5 km, whether or not the aerodrome is in controlled airspace or has an associated ATZ.
Restricted Areas
1.37 Operators must note that ENSF clearance for Restricted Areas also involves security considerations that would apply to any flight by a SUA whether or not engaged in aerial work or equipped for surveillance or data acquisition. The ENSF process may take up to 28 days before the grant of an approval.
Source Documents
-NAMA Air Navigation publications and The Regulations.
-NAMA AIP Aeronautical Information Publication.
-Nig. CARs Part 14 (Rules of the Air).
-(Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) for Implementing Regulations (JARIUS)
Scope
2.1 For the purposes of this guidance, international boundaries are considered to be coincident with lateral FIR/UIR boundaries.
Policy
2.2 UAS operators planning to operate beyond an international FIR/UIR boundary must comply with the regulatory and ATM requirements applicable to the territories over which the UAS is flown; these may differ from Nigerian requirements. Whilst the NCAA will provide guidance on cross border ATC procedures, including detailing the arrangements for those areas of airspace where ATS provision is delegated either to or by the Nigerian guidance on foreign national procedures is to be sought from the appropriate State National Aviation Authority (NAA). This requirement stems from Article 8 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (‘Chicago Convention’), which states that:
“No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such an authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to ensure that the flight of such an aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft”.
2.3 For the purposes of the Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such state (Chicago Convention Article 2). 2.4 ICAO requirements concerning the authorization of UAS flight across the territory of another State are published at Appendix 4 to ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air.
Scope
3.1 Air Traffic Services (ATS) in Nigeria are provided by personnel who are suitably trained and qualified to provide services for Air Traffic Control, Flight Information Services and Air/Ground Communication Service. It is not possible to anticipate all of the issues and queries relating to ATS integration that will inevitably arise during the future development of UAS and their operational procedures. Any enquiries for further guidance or to establish Nigeria’s policy on a particular issue must be made to the NCAA.
3.2 This Chapter provides guidance on the policy associated with the provision of Air Traffic Services within Nigerian airspace.
Policy
3.3 Individual ATS units may provide services within clearly defined geographic boundaries (such as a specific portion of airspace) or may provide services within a general area (for example, in the vicinity of an aerodrome).
3.4 The rules pertaining to aircraft flight and to the ATS provided will be determined by a number of factors (including airspace categorization, weather conditions, aircraft flight rules and type of ATSU).
3.5 Not all aircraft within the same geographic area will necessarily be in communication with the same ATSU or operating under the same rules.
3.6 It is important that those managing UAS operations are familiar with the relevant rules and procedures applicable within any airspace through which the aircraft will be flown.
3.7 UAS operation is expected to be transparent to ATS providers. The pilot will be required to respond to ATS guidance or requests for information, and comply with any ATC instruction, in the same way and within the same timeframe that the pilot of a manned aircraft would. These instructions may take a variety of forms, for example, to follow another aircraft or to confirm that another aircraft is in sight.
3.8 International regulations and standards require that any new system, procedure or operation that has an impact on the safety of aerodrome operations or ATS shall be subject to a risk assessment and mitigation process to support its safe introduction and operation. Where an agency intends to operate a UAS in the Nigerian Airspace, it will be required to provide with a safety assessment demonstrating that associated hazards to other airspace users have been identified, that the risks have been assessed and either eliminated or reduced to a level which is at least tolerable and is as low as reasonably practicable through ATS and/or other measures.
3.9 Where it is intended to operate a UAS in segregated airspace such a safety assessment must reflect measures intended to reduce the risk of mid-air collision between UAS and between UAS and manned aircraft. The safety assessment (which may also be presented in the form of a safety case or ATS sub-section of a broader UAS OSC) would be expected to include safety arguments concerning ATS and/or other measures to reduce the risk of accidents resulting from unplanned incursions into the segregated airspace by manned aircraft and unplanned excursions from the segregated airspace by the UAS.
Source Documents
3.10 Further information about the various levels of ATS and the services available from
-ATS units can be found in the NAMA AIP and website.
3.11 Further information about the classification of airspace and flight rules can be found in NAMA’s Aeronautical Information Publication.
3.12 Further information about radiotelephony procedures can be in Part 14 of Nig. CARs 2015.
3.13 Further guidance on the conduct of safety assessments relating to ATS aspects of UAS operations can be found in Part 20 of Nig. CARs 2015, Part 12 of Nig. CARs as well as ICAO Doc 9859 Guidance on the Conduct of Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and the Production of Safety Cases: For Aerodrome Operators and Air Traffic Service Providers.
Scope
4.1 The guidance below outlines the requirements for an operator of a UAS in the Nigerian airspace to include robust provision for ATM aspects of the efficient handling of relevant UAS emergencies.
4.2 Pre-planned arrangements for emergency maneuvering of UAS, including maneuver into emergency orbit areas, emergency landing areas, ‘cut-down’ points and ditching areas, must be developed in consultation with NCAA Directorate of Aerodrome and Airspace Standards, who will coordinate with NAMA.
Policy
4.3 In accordance with the overarching principle that UAS operation is expected to be transparent to ATS providers, the ATM handling of emergencies involving UAS will be expected to follow the same process as that for manned aircraft with the air traffic controller/Flight Information Service Officer / Air -Ground radio operator providing assistance to the Remote Pilot in order to recover and/or land the UAS without injury to life and, where possible, without damage to property. However, the absolutely overriding objective in any emergency situation is the safety of human life. ATM procedures for dealing with UAS emergencies must, therefore, focus on assisting the Remote Pilot to resolve the situation without endangering other airspace users or people on the ground. Although the ATS provider can offer assistance, ultimate responsibility for concluding a UAS emergency safely must rest with the Remote Pilot.
4.4 UAS operators must, as a minimum, develop procedures which provide for the emergency notification of the relevant ATM agencies in the event that guidance of a UAS is lost or significantly restricted. Such notification must include the last known position, altitude and speed of the aircraft and sufficient additional information, such as endurance, which would enable other airspace users and aerodrome operators to be alerted to the hazard. Such notification arrangements must be reflected in the UAS operator’s safety assessment.
Source Documents
4.5 Further information about ATS arrangements for dealing with aircraft emergencies resides with NAMA.
Scope
5.1 Guidance relating to breaches of civil ATC regulations must be sought from NCAA and NAMA.
Point of Contact
5.2 For queries relating to the content of NCAA-GAD-AC-002: The RPAS Review Committee General Aviation Directorate (GAD), NCAA Aviation House Murtala Mohammed Airport Ikeja – Lagos. E-mail: dele.sasegbon@ncaa.gov.ng
For matters concerning operations or approvals: The Director General Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority Aviation House Murtala Mohammed Airport Ikeja – Lagos Telephone: 012790421 E-mail: info@ncaa.gov.ng
Scope
6.1 The Nig. CARs does not require UAS operations to take place from aerodromes licensed by the NCAA. This Chapter applies to those UAS operations that take place at licensed aerodromes.
6.2 It is not possible to anticipate all of the issues and queries relating to aerodrome operations that will inevitably arise during the future development and operation of UAS. Any enquiries for further guidance or to establish a Nigerian policy on particular issues must be made to the NCAA.
Policy
6.3 The aerodrome license holder is required to demonstrate how the safety of those aircraft requiring the use of a licensed aerodrome will be assured when UAS operations are permitted at the aerodrome.
6.4 The operation of UAS at a licensed aerodrome must be conducted in accordance with safety management requirements set out in the Aerodrome Manuals of the aerodrome. This Manual, which forms a core element of the aerodrome’s Safety Management System (SMS), contains the safety policies, accountabilities, responsibilities and procedures to facilitate the safe operation of the aerodrome.
6.5 It is essential that those managing UAS operations are familiar with the relevant rules and procedures applicable at the aerodrome from which they operate. The aerodrome license holder must provide an operating manual or other documents pertaining to the operation of UAS at that aerodrome, to ensure that risks from all aspects of the intended UAS operation are assessed and mitigated.
6.6 Aerodrome and UAS operating procedures may be subject to audit by the NCAA.
Source Documents
6.7 Information about the licensing and operation of aerodromes can be found in the following documents:
-Part 12 Aerodromes of Nig. CARs 2015.
-Aerodrome Manuals of Standards.
Scope
7.1 The safe operation of UAS is as important as that of manned aircraft, and third party injury and damage to property can be just as severe when caused by either type of aircraft. Proper investigation of each accident, serious incident or other occurrence is absolutely necessary in order to identify causal factors and to prevent repetition. Similarly, the sharing of safety related information is critical in reducing the number of occurrences. The limited operational experience with UAS in civil applications makes such investigation particularly relevant.
7.2 This Chapter outlines the principles that must be employed with regard to the reporting and further investigation of occurrences involving the operation of all civilian unmanned aircraft within the Nigerian airspace; it also covers occurrences involving Nigerian-registered unmanned aircraft that take place within the airspace of other nations.
Definitions
7.3 The current definitions of ‘Accident’ and ‘Serious Incident’ originate from the Nig. CARs, which in turn are directly linked to the ICAO Annex 13 definitions.
7.4 An Accident is defined as: ‘An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked or, in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which:
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
-being in the aircraft, or,
-direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become
-detached from the aircraft, or,
-direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to a single engine (including its cowlings or accessories), to propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, vanes, tires, brakes, wheels, fairings, panels, landing gear doors, windscreens, the aircraft skin (such as small dents or puncture holes) or minor damages to main rotor blades, tail rotor blades, landing gear, and those resulting from hail or bird strike (including holes in the radome); or
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.’
7.5 A Serious Incident is defined as: ‘An incident involving circumstances indicating that there was a high probability of an accident and associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked or, in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down.’
NOTE: The difference between an accident and a serious incident lies only in the result.
7.6 A Reportable Occurrence is defined as: ‘Any incident which endangers or which, if not corrected, would endanger an aircraft, its occupants or any other person.’
Policy
7.7 Any person involved (as defined in Nig. CARs) who has knowledge of the occurrence of an accident or serious incident in Nigerian airspace must report it to the AIB. Such persons include (but are not limited to) the owner, operator and pilot of a UAS.
7.8 All other occurrences must be reported under the Authority’s Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme (MOR).
7.9 The following aircraft categories are specifically covered by the MOR Scheme (i.e. all occurrences must be reported):
• any aircraft operated under an Air Operator’s Certificate granted by the Authority;
• any turbine-powered aircraft which has a Certificate of Airworthiness issued by the Authority.
7.10 Although these categories would appear to exclude the vast majority of UAS applications, all occurrences related to UAS operations which are considered to have endangered, or might have endangered, any aircraft (including the subject unmanned aircraft) or any person or property, must still be reported to the Authority via the MOR Scheme. This applies equally to all UAS categories, regardless of the aircraft’s mass or certification state. It also includes Nigerian registered UAS operating outside the Nigerian airspace.
7.11 Part 8 of Nig. CARs as well as ICAO Annex 13 lists the types of occurrence that are likely to fall into the definition of a ‘reportable occurrence’. Whilst some of the listed occurrences would clearly only apply to manned aviation, many will apply equally to UAS, in particular those associated with the operation of the aircraft; there are also failure modes that are UAS specific. In addition to those listed in Part 8 of Nig. CARs as well as ICAO Annex 13, other, more UAS-specific, reportable occurrences include events such as:
-Loss of control/datalink – where that loss resulted in an event that was potentially prejudicial to the safety of other airspace users or third parties.
-Navigation failures;
-Pilot station configuration changes/errors:
- between Pilot Stations;
- transfer to/from launch control / mission control stations;
- display failures.
-Crew Resource Management (CRM) failures/confusion;
-Structural damage/heavy landings;
-Flight programming errors (e.g. incorrect speed programmed);
-Any incident that injures a third party.
Source Documents
Part 8 of Nig. CARs
ICAO Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation.
Points of Contact
Accident / Serious Incident: The Commissioner Accidents Investigation Bureau (AIB) Murtala Mohammed Airport Ikeja Lagos.
Accident / Serious Incident: The RPAS Review Committee General Aviation Directorate (GAD), NCAA Aviation House Murtala Mohammed Airport Ikeja – Lagos. E-mail: dele.sasegbon@ncaa.gov.ng
Mandatory Occurrence Reporting: The Director General Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority Aviation House Murtala Mohammed Airport Ikeja – Lagos Telephone: 012790421 E-mail: info@ncaa.gov.ng
Introduction
8.1 This Advisory Circular does not address the leasing of communication links. This will be addressed separately once the ICAO RPAS Panel reaches a conclusion on this subject. Until an ICAO position on leasing communication links is reached, it will only be possible to take limited certification credit for communication links between the control station(s) and air vehicle(s).
Aim
8.2 The aim of this chapter is to clarify the position of the NCAA with respect to the leasing, chartering, code sharing, interchanging and franchising of UAS.
Policy
8.3 Where an ROC holder wishes to lease, charter, code share, franchise or interchange a UAS it is strongly recommended that they communicate with the NCAA in order to obtain the most appropriate and detailed guidance.
8.4 Further guidance can be found in the “Aircraft Leasing – Approval Requirements under the Part 9 of Nig. CARs 2015 Air Operator Certificate and Administration” which can be found on the NCAA website.
8.5 It is anticipated that at some point in the future there will be a desire for commercial organizations to be able to lease UAS or parts thereof. If UAS are being operated commercially then any leasing arrangements will need to meet the relevant operational rules.
Lead Agency
8.6 At this time, with the exception of wet leasing of third country aircraft, the Authority has responsibility for oversight of aircraft leasing.
8.7 The issuance of approvals for wet leasing of third country aircraft is currently the responsibility of the Authority.
Operational Factors for SUA Flights within Congested Areas
A1 In order to fly a SUA in a congested area, SUA operators must establish safety and operational control measures that prevent the SUA from endangering the general public. Operators are advised to ensure that their existing risk assessment and operating procedures address the enhanced measures required for congested areas. The procedures must address all relevant aspects of the congested areas they intend to operate within, taking into account any special circumstances or local conditions. Such measures may include but not be limited to:
-Segregation. Segregating the activities from public interference by placing physical barriers and cordons, or using other built/natural features that effectively separate the SUA operation from the general public.
-Crowd control. Marshaling or other active crowd control measures that restrict access to the area within which the SUA is operating.
-Utilization of other agencies. Liaising with the Police, local authorities and other controlling agencies/organization to gain official road closures, traffic cessation or site access restrictions.
Note: These measures will ideally be proportionate to the risk posed by the SUA, bearing in mind the limited flight times and size and weight of the aircraft. Temporary restrictions may suffice in some cases. Restrictions that would be suitable for a full-size aircraft such as a helicopter in most cases would not be applicable to a SUA.
-Wind and turbulence. Taking account of changes of wind strength and direction at varying heights above the surface. Wind shear, ‘rotor’ and ‘curl over’ effects may be present at any point on the planned flight path caused by interactions between buildings and strong winds or when transitioning from flight over land to over water.
-Radio Frequency (RF) interference. Pilots must take account of the possible reduction in operating range in an urban environment due to the heavy use of communications equipment (mobile telephone, Wi-Fi etc.) and other sources of electromagnetic spectrum/RF interference. Mitigation for the consequences of weak or lost GPS signal due to masking by buildings must be considered along with the general RF saturation level. The use of a spectrum analyzer is recommended to assist in assessing the level of local electromagnetic and RF congestion in the 2.4 GHz or 35 MHz frequency range.
-Emergency procedures. SUA emergency procedures planned to be implemented during controller/transmitter/loss of GPS guidance failure modes must be able to be put into effect without breaching the minimum separation distances or flying directly overhead persons/vehicles. An automatic ‘Return-to-Base’ feature must not cause a hazard to anyone off the nominal flight path; this may limit the SUA to mainly vertical flight paths directly above the launch point.
-Test flights. It is desirable to conduct limited test flights (hover controllability check) and other systems tests at the launch point before committing to the full flight profile. The integration and correct set-up of the camera and gimbaled-mount will also be checked at this time to avoid unnecessary calibration flights.
A2 The procedures and limitations on the use of the SUA that will be used to establish these control measures must be stated in the Volume 1 of the UAS OSC.
Site Survey Assessment
A3 The use of non-established sites for flying UA requires an assessment of the suitability of that site to be made prior to commencing operations. Such an assessment must be made using a site visit and available information from at least the aeronautical charts, as well as other sources of information such as the NAMA Aeronautical Information Service, digital imagery (Google Earth/ Maps etc.) and Ordnance Survey maps etc.
A4 Typical elements of an assessment that could affect the safety of the flight would include:
-the type of airspace and specific provisions (e.g. Controlled Airspace);
-other aircraft operations (local aerodromes or operating sites);
-hazards associated with industrial sites or such activities as live firing, gas venting, high-intensity radio transmissions etc.;
-local by-laws;
-obstructions (wires, masts, buildings etc.);
-extraordinary restrictions such as segregated airspace around prisons, nuclear establishments etc. (suitable authorization may be needed); habitation and recreational activities;
-public access;
-authorization from landowner;
-likely operating site and alternative sites;
-weather conditions for the planned flight;
-minimum separation distances from persons, vessels, vehicles and structures.
Overflight of People
A5 In the absence of airworthiness certification, the overflight of persons not under the control of the pilot is restricted and described in the conditions of the Authorization issued by the NCAA. For UA of 25 kg and below, the following shall apply:
Small unmanned aircraft
(1) A person must not cause or authorize any article or animal (whether or not attached to a parachute) to be dropped from a small unmanned aircraft so as to endanger persons or property.
(2) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft may only fly the aircraft if reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made.
(3) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft must maintain direct, unaided visual contact with the aircraft sufficient to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles, vessels and structures for the purpose of avoiding collisions.
(4) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft which has a mass of more than 7kg excluding its fuel but including any articles or equipment installed in or attached to the aircraft at the commencement of its flight, must not fly the aircraft:
(a) in Class A, C, D or E airspace unless the permission of the appropriate air traffic control unit has been obtained;
(b) within an aerodrome traffic zone during the notified hours of watch of the air traffic control unit (if any) at that aerodrome unless the permission of any such air traffic control unit has been obtained; or
(c) at a height of more than 400 feet above the surface unless it is flying in airspace described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b) above, and in accordance with the requirements for that airspace.
(5) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft must not fly the aircraft for the purposes of aerial work except in accordance with an authorization granted by the NCAA.
Small unmanned surveillance aircraft
For UA operations over 25 kg, the overflight of persons may be allowed subject to the assessment of the UAS Operating Safety Case and / or airworthiness certification and appropriate operational procedures.
(1) The person in charge of a small unmanned surveillance aircraft must not fly the aircraft in any of the circumstances described in paragraph (2) except in accordance with an authorization issued by the NCAA.
(2) The circumstances referred to in paragraph (1) are:
(a) over or within 150 meters of any congested area;
(b) over or within 150 meters of an organized open-air assembly of more than 1,000 persons;
(c) within 50 meters of any vessel, vehicle or structure which is not under the control of the person in charge of the aircraft; or
(d) subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), within 50 meters of any person.
(3) Subject to paragraph (4), during take-off or landing, a small unmanned surveillance aircraft must not be flown within 30 meters of any person.
(4) Paragraphs (2)(d) and (3) do not apply to the person in charge of the small unmanned surveillance aircraft or a person under the control of the person in charge of the aircraft.
(5) In this Advisory Circular ‘a small unmanned surveillance aircraft’ means a small unmanned aircraft which is equipped to undertake any form of surveillance or data acquisition.
A6 The safety case for the overflight of people must include an assessment of the Kinetic Energy Limits and the method of flight termination. Two crash scenarios must be considered in determining the impact kinetic energy of the UA, as follows:
-a free-fall from 400 ft for all UA;
-additionally, for a UA capable of high forward speed, a maximum impact speed (set as 1.4 x maximum achievable steady speed in level flight).
A7 Assuming negligible aerodynamic drag, an object dropped from 400 ft will hit the surface at 95 kt and the kinetic energy at impact will be 95 kJ if the mass of the object is 80 kg. If the object exhibits significant aerodynamic drag (without reliance upon any on-board parachute deployment system), the impact velocity will be less and a higher mass may be permissible without exceeding a calculated 95 kJ.
A8 In the second scenario and with a maximum speed of 70 kt, 95 kJ equates to a mass of 75 kg. The mass can be increased up to a maximum of 150 kg, provided the maximum achievable steady level flight speed is sufficiently low that the energy limit is not exceeded (e.g. at 150 kg a maximum speed of 49 kt is permitted).
Operational Limitations
A9 An authorization or exemption for UA conducting aerial work or equipped to undertake any form of surveillance or data acquisition will include a number of operational limitations.
A10 For SUAs, these limitations will normally include a prohibition on flight:
-at a height exceeding 400 feet above ground level;
-at a distance beyond the visual range of the Remote Pilot, or a maximum range of 500 meters;
-over, or within 150 meters of, any congested area of a city, town or settlement;
-within 50 meters of any person, vessel, vehicle or structure not under the control of the person in charge except that during the take-off or landing the SUA must not fly within 30 meters of any person other than the person in charge of the SUA or a person in charge of any other SUA or a person necessarily present in connection with the operation of such a UA;
-unless it is equipped with a mechanism that will cause the SUA to land in the event of disruption to or a failure of any of its control systems, including the radio link, and the person in charge of the SUA has satisfied himself that such mechanism is in working order before the UA commences its flight;
-unless the person in charge of the SUA has reasonably satisfied himself that any load carried by the UA is properly secured, that the SUA is in an airworthy condition and that the flight can safely be made taking into account the wind and other significant weather conditions;
-unless the operator maintains records of each flight made pursuant to the authorization and makes such records available to the NCAA on request;
-unless a site safety assessment has been completed by the operator and these site safety assessments are made available to the NCAA on request;
-unless the authorization of the landowner on whose land the SUA is intended to take off and land has been obtained;
-unless in accordance with the operations manual submitted to the NCAA.
A11 SUAs with a mass of more than 7 kg may be subject to additional operational limitations to those stated above, in accordance with A10 of this Advisory Circular, these operational limitations will normally include a prohibition on flight:
-in Class A, C, D or E airspace unless the authorization of the appropriate ATC unit has been obtained;
-within an aerodrome traffic zone during the notified hours of watch of the ATC unit (if any) at that aerodrome unless the authorization of any such ATC unit has been obtained; or
-at a height exceeding 400 ft above the surface unless it is flying in airspace described in sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) and in accordance with the requirements thereof.
A12 The NCAA may also impose additional limitations as it thinks fit; such limitations will normally include a prohibition on:
-flights that have not been notified to the Authority prior to the flights taking place;
-flights where the maximum achievable steady speed in level flight is greater than 70 knots;
-aerobatic flight;
-tasks that involve aerial inspection of, or flight close to, any object or installation that would present a risk to safety in the event of damage due to any impact by the UA (e.g. chemical/gas storage areas);
-participation in any public flying display (except with the written authorization of the NCAA).
UAS OSC – Volume 1 – Operations Manual
{Enter company name} UAS Operating Safety Case Volume 1 – Operations Manual Version X.x Dated XX Xxx XX Conditions: {This document must be an original work representing the applicant Company. The Company must take responsibility for its own safety case, whether the material originates from this template or otherwise. Any significant changes to the Company’s OSC will require further assessment, by the NCAA or approved organisation, prior to further operations being conducted.}
Safety Statement {The person responsible for the safe conduct of all of the Company’s operations must make and sign this statement. The statement must include, as a minimum, a statement that the company is safe to operate in the proposed environment, that the system(s) to be employed can be operated safely and a commitment to operate within the bounds of this UAS OSC, the Operations Manual and any NCAA authorisation granted. Where necessary it must also include a commitment to conduct further mitigation actions detailed within this UAS OSC. A commitment to safety, as a priority, must be detailed.}
Acronyms and Abbreviations {Detail all acronyms or abbreviations used throughout the document- there is no need to further expand any acronym or abbreviation within the document body}
Contents {The contents of this document must contain those items listed below as a minimum} Title Page Safety Statement Amendment Record Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Safety Policy
3. Organization
4. Operations
1. Introduction {This section must be used to outline the scope of the document, its intent and the overarching strategy of the company.}
2. Safety Policy {The company’s safety policy, safety management system, safety targets, etc. must be detailed.}
3. Organization {This section must give full details of the organisation that is subject to the application – all areas detailed below must be covered as a minimum. Where examples are given they do not outline the full requirement. }
3.1 Structure of organization and management lines {Organogram and brief description.}
3.2 Nominated personnel {Scalable as appropriate, e.g. Accountable Manager, Operations Manager, Technical Manager, Chief Pilot, Other Pilots These are not official posts in the sense of an organization applying for an RPA Operator’s Certificate (ROC) and multiple functions may be filled by the same person. Each function must however be covered in brief and any internal audit/quality function must be fulfilled by a separate person, e.g. camera operator.}
3.3 Responsibility and duties of the Pilot in Command of the SUA
3.4 Responsibility and duties of support personnel in the operation of the SUA {Operators may use an assistant to help with the operation of the aircraft. Give a brief description of this person’s responsibilities and duties.}
3.5 Areas of operation {Brief description of geographic scope and expected distance from people and structures, etc. Likely operating areas e.g. building sites, open countryside, roads etc.}
3.6 Type of operation {Include details of the operations e.g. VLOS, day/night, weather, etc.}
3.7 Supervision of SUA operations {A description of any system to supervise the operations of the operator/operator team}
3.8 Accident prevention and Flight Safety program {Include any reporting requirements}
3.9 Flight team composition {Make up of the flight team depending on type of operation, complexity, type of aircraft etc.}
3.10 Operation of multiple types of SUA {Any limitations considered appropriate to the numbers and types of SUA that a pilot may operate if appropriate.}
3.11 Qualification requirements {Details of any qualifications, experience or training necessary for the pilot or support crew for the types of SUA and the roles employed by the operator}
3.12 Crew health {A statement and any requirements, procedures, guidance etc. (or references) to ensure that the operating team – the ‘crew’ – are appropriately fit, capable and able to conduct the planned operations before conducting any operations}
3.13 Logs and records {Requirements for logs and records of pilots and other data considered useful for the tracking and monitoring of the activity}
3.14 Details of the operator training program {Training and checking requirements for pilots and support crew as determined by the operator to cover initial, refresher and conversion syllabi. Include any independent assessment of pilot competency and currency requirements}
3.15 Accident/incident and investigation policy {Provide company accident/incident response and investigation policy}
3.15 Copy of NCAA Authorization {This will provide immediate reference to the conditions under which the operations are to be conducted when applicable – a copy of the authorization must be attached}
3.16 Other documents {As considered necessary but must include copy of insurance document – copies of any documents must be attached}
4. Operations {This section must be used to give details of the operating environment and procedures subject to the application – all areas detailed below must be covered as a minimum. Where examples are given they do not outline the full requirement. }
4.1 Role Training and currency {Detail any training undertaken, beyond basic BNUC-S (Basic National UAS CertificateSmall) / RPQ (Remote Pilot Qualification), that prepares the pilot for flying in a particular environment, e.g. urban. Provide details of any company minimum experience requirements, currency requirements, skills tests or manufacturer courses that support the case for an appropriate level of competency and knowledge for the proposed operations. These may include in-house or outsourced training.}
4.2 Area of operation {Full detail of expected areas of geographic operations. Including operating areas e.g. building sites, open countryside, roads etc.}
4.3 Operating limitations and conditions {Minimum and maximum operating conditions in compliance with Part 21 of Nig. CARs 2019 (currently in review) and conditions of any NCAA Authorization}
4.4 Methods to determine the intended tasks and feasibility {Process undertaken to determine feasibility of intended task}
4.5 Operating site planning and assessment. {Airspace operating environment considerations and procedures (e.g. Controlled Airspace), operations near other aircraft operations (local aerodromes or operating sites), operations near industrial sites or such activities as live firing, gas venting, high-intensity radio transmissions etc., local bylaw considerations, obstructions (wires, masts, buildings etc.), extraordinary restrictions such as segregated airspace around prisons, nuclear establishments, habitation and recreational activities, public access, authorization from landowner, likely operating site and alternative sites, weather considerations, etc.}
4.9 Communications {Awareness and links with other users, aircraft operators and air traffic service providers}
4.10 Pre-notification { If a flight is to be performed within an Aerodrome Traffic Zone, or near to any aerodrome or aircraft operating site then their contact details must be obtained and notification of the intended operation must be provided prior to take-off. It may be necessary to inform the local police of the intended operation to avoid interruption or concerns from the public.}
4.11 Site authorizations {Procedures document to describe how to gain landowner’s or authority authorization}
4.12 Weather {Methods of obtaining weather forecasts. Consideration of SUA limitations}
4.13 On site procedures
-Site Survey {Methods of surveying operating area and identifying hazards and any risk assessment}
-Selection of operating area and alternate {Methods of identifying and selecting area including: size, shape, surrounds, surface, slope, etc. Landing zone for an automatic ‘home’ return must be identified and kept clear}
-Crew briefing {Procedures to brief crew for e.g. task, responsibilities, duties, emergencies etc.}
-Cordon Procedure {Adherence of separation criteria}
-Communications {Procedures to maintain contact with crew, local and with adjacent air operations if appropriate}
-Weather Checks {Awareness of weather impacts on limitations and operating considerations}
-Refueling {to include changing / charging of batteries}
-Loading of equipment {detail of procedure taken to ensure security of loaded equipment}
4.14 Assembly and functional checks {Checks conducted on completion of assembly of the system}
4.15 Pre-flight checks {Checks conducted immediately prior to flight}
4.16 Flight Procedures {Start, take-off, in flight, landing, shutdown}
4.17 Post flight and between flight checks {Detail the checks or inspections conducted both after flight and between consecutive flights}
4.18 Emergency Procedures {Include lost link, flyaway, fire (air vehicle and ground station), etc. Preventative measures must also be detailed}
4.19 Give details of any additional safety, training or operational requirements that individual clients specify for the proposed operations. {Include any additional types of training or qualification that individual clients mandate. Also include any specific assessment, audit or quality procedures that the client imposes for sub-contractors, where these enhance or supplement those of your own organization.}
UAS OSC – Volume 2 – Systems {Enter company name} UAS Operating Safety Case Volume 2 – Systems Version X.x Dated XX Xxx XX {Conditions: This document must be an original work representing the applicant Company. The Company must take responsibility for its own safety case, whether the material originates from this template or otherwise. Any significant changes to the Company’s UAS OSC will require further assessment, by the NCAA or approved organisation, prior to further operations being conducted. All text in {curly brackets} is guidance only and must be deleted from the Company’s UAS OSC}
Acronyms and Abbreviations {Detail all acronyms or abbreviations used throughout the document- there is no need to further expand any acronym or abbreviation within the document body}
Contents {The contents of this document must contain those items listed below as a minimum} Title Page Amendment Record Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Systems {This section must be used to give technical descriptions and details of each system that is subject to the application – all areas detailed below must be covered as a minimum. Where examples are given they do not outline the full requirement}
1.1 Details of design and manufacturing organization(s) and any recognized standards to which the equipment has been designed, built and tested {The designer and manufacturer may be the same company, or may be conducted by the operator. Details of any standards that may or may not be aviation related and may add to the safety argument. Where known this must include test and evaluation evidence}
1.2 The design flight envelope {Full description of the flight envelope including duration, communications range, maximum height, speeds to maintain safe flight, glide distances (where appropriate), OAT limitations, etc., etc. Include effects on flight envelope with differing payloads}
1.3 Air vehicle characteristics {Full characteristics to be given including dimensions and mass with and without fuel, with and without any payloads, etc.}
1.4 Design features {Detail the main design features of the air vehicle, propulsion layout, intended payload etc.}
1.5 Construction {Detail the build nature of each air vehicle, materials used, method of construction etc}
1.6 Electrical power provision and distribution {Detail the electrical power provision and distribution, include battery type and number, generator specifications, equipment ratings, load shedding where appropriate, etc.}
1.7 Propulsion system {Detail the propulsion system(s) used, power output, type of propeller/rotor, etc.}
1.8 Fuel System {Detail the fuel system arrangement, type of fuel, fuel delivery, etc.}
1.9 Flight Management System (FMS) and Flight Control System {Detail of how the air vehicle is controlled, control linkages, control rigging, include any automatic stabilization, etc.}
1.10 Navigation and Guidance {Detail the system used for navigation and guidance, include any automatic piloting, telemetry etc.}
1.11 Other avionics {Detail any other avionics fitted to the system}
1.14 Landing aids {Detail the landing system and any landing aids fitted to the system}
1.15 Payloads {For each air vehicle give a technical description of the payload expected to be installed or carried}
1.16 Emergency recovery or safety systems {Detail any systems fitted to the air vehicle or ground control station that contribute to safe flight or handling including their modes of operation e.g. ballistic parachutes, propeller guards etc.}
1.17 Modifications to the system {Detail any modifications that have been made post initial design}
1.18 Change Management (modifications) {Detail how the organization manages and records changes to the original design}
1.19 Command and Control C2 {How status, control and positioning signals are relayed between the ground station and air vehicle. Also, details of frequencies, types/methods of securing (pairing, encryption etc.) used etc.}
1.20 Whole system Single Points of Failure (SPOF) {For each element of the whole system, identify where SPOF may exist}
1.21 Ground Control Station {Where a home computer, laptop, tablet or similar device is utilized give details of the type of operating system and other technical specifications. Give detail of process for firmware and software updates}
1.22 Lifing, maintenance schedules and inspections {Give full detail of the maintenance regime of each system, including maintenance log description, maintenance procedures and processes}
1.23 Spares {Describe the process by which any spares are procured and validated}
1.24 Repair {Where repairs to the system are necessary describe the repair philosophy}
1.25 Known failure modes {For the whole system identify known failure modes and detail preventative strategy}
1.26 Failsafe features {Detail any failsafe features in the design of the system}
1.27 Transportation requirements {Detail how the system is transported between sites. Include all carry cases, transport description etc.}
UAS OSC – Volume 3 – Safety Assessment {Enter company name} UAS Operating Safety Case Volume 3 – Safety Assessment Version X.x Dated XX Xxx XX {Conditions: This document must be an original work representing the applicant Company. The Company must take responsibility for its own safety case, whether the material originates from this template or otherwise. Any significant changes to the Company’s UAS OSC will require further assessment, by the NCAA or approved organisation, prior to further operations being conducted. All text in {curly brackets} is guidance only and must be deleted from the Company’s UAS OSC}
Acronyms and Abbreviations {Detail all acronyms or abbreviations used throughout the document- there is no need to further expand any acronym or abbreviation within the document body}
Contents {The contents of this document must contain those items listed below as a minimum} Title Page Amendment Record Acronyms and Abbreviations 1. Hazard and Risk Assessment 2. Self-Assessment 3. Summary
1. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment {Conduct hazard identification and risk assessment of your intended operations. Tables 1 to 4 may be used; alternatives may also be used but may require justification for their use. The assessment must cover all elements of the operation including a technical risk assessment of the system(s). Give details of those persons present and contributing to the risk assessment process.}
Unacceptable – The risk is unacceptable and major mitigation measures are required to reduce the level of risk to as low as reasonably practicable. Review – The level of risk is of concern and mitigation measures are required to reduce the level of risk to as low as reasonable practicable. Where further risk reduction/mitigation is not practical or viable, the risk may be accepted, provided that the risk is understood and has endorsement of the responsible person within the organization (e.g. accountable manager). Acceptable – Risk is considered acceptable but must be reviewed if it recurs.
2. Self-Assessment {Using the evidence given in the document thus far, conduct a self-assessment of the intended operations; this must be undertaken using a claim, argument and evidence process. Ultimately this section must support that the company is safe to operate in the proposed environment and that the system(s) to be employed can be operated safely; there must be no area of intended operations that are not covered in some way by this section. There is no mandatory requirement to use complex techniques (e.g. Goal Structured Notation). The following explanation is provided for clarity: Claim – an assertion that is made (e.g. ‘The UAS operator(s) is suitably experienced and qualified for the intended operations’) Argument – this describes the argument to support the claim (e.g. The UAS operator(s) holds a ‘xxxxxxxxx’ operator’s certificate, is independently assessed in all modes of flight by ‘xxxxxx’ association and has ‘xxx’ hours experience on this system ‘xxx’ hours of which have been in the intended operating environment, etc.) Evidence – this references the evidence to support the argument. (So, to support the claim ‘the UAS operator(s) is suitably experienced and qualified for the intended operations’- the operator’s log, operator’s certificate, etc., could be provided or referred to. It is important that any referenced evidence is either already embedded in the UAS OSC, is attached as an enclosure to the UAS OSC or a working hyperlink is provided that leads to the evidence. Representation in a tabular format is deemed sufficient (but not mandatory) for the claim, argument, evidence self-assessment. This section will contribute to the Safety Statement made in Volume 1 of the UAS OSC.}
3. Summary {Summarize the whole document (i.e. all three volumes) drawing out key elements that outline why the company’s intended operations are safe to be conducted. A statement of intent to operate to the principles and guidelines given in this UAS OSC must also be given.}
1. Full Category Scope
E1 A National Qualified Entity (NQE) for Small Unmanned Aircraft (SUA) is an organization (person) approved by the Authority to carry out assessments of the operators of SUA not exceeding 25 kg mass, and who is authorized to submit reports and recommendations to the Authority in respect of the operator. This Appendix sets out the requirements to be met by organizations seeking Nigerian national approval as a Full Category NQE.
E2 With regard to the assessment of potential SUA operators, Full Category NQE applicants will be required to demonstrate their organization’s ability and procedures to assess the competence of SUA remote pilots, based on both a theoretical knowledge/general airmanship examination (subjects and areas that are to be assessed are set out below) and a practical flight assessment. In addition, Full Category NQE applicants are required to demonstrate that they have appropriate procedures for the assessment of a potential SUA operator’s operations manual (UAS OSC Volume 1) and to make recommendations for the award of an authorization to operate to the Authority.
Eligibility
E3 Any natural or legal person (organization) shall be eligible as an applicant for an approval under these requirements.
Application
E4 Initial applications for approval as a Full Category NQE are to be made in writing to uavenquiries@ncaa.gov.ng using NQE Form.
E5 When applying, the applicant must undertake to pay an annual charge. The initial application charge for one calendar year for a Full Category NQE is N250,000 (to be paid on application). The application will not be processed until the initial charge has been received. The approval charge for subsequent years (renewal) will be at the lower rate of N125,000 per annum.
E6 Amendments that result in a change to the approval of the organization will be subject to approval by the Authority and a variation charge of N50,000 will be incurred.
Issue of Approval
E7 An organization shall be entitled to be approved as a Full Category NQE by the Authority when it has demonstrated compliance with the applicable requirements.
Requirements for the Grant of Approval
General Requirements
E8 Where an organization that is seeking approval as a Full Category NQE is also involved in the commercial operation of SUA, or any other SUA operations for which NCAA Authorization is required, there must be a distinct division between the operations and the NQE activities such that the objectivity of the recommendations and reports made under the NQE approval is not called into question.
E9 The entity and the staff responsible for the assessment tasks must have the knowledge and competence to conduct the assessments and must be free of any pressure and incentive which could affect their judgment or the results of their investigations.
E10 The entity must demonstrate the capability to adequately perform the technical and administrative tasks linked with the assessment process, including the use of personnel, facilities and equipment appropriate to the task.
E11 The staff responsible for assessment must have:
-sound technical and vocational training;
-satisfactory knowledge of the requirements for the assessment tasks they carry out and adequate experience of such processes;
-the ability to administer the declarations, records and reports that demonstrate that the relevant assessments have been carried out and the conclusions of those assessments.
E12 The impartiality of the assessment staff must be guaranteed. Their remuneration must not depend on the number of assessments carried out or on the results of such assessments.
E13 The Full Category NQE and the staff of the organization shall not disclose information supplied by the operator to any person other than the Authority.
Specific Requirements
E14 The organization shall demonstrate, on the basis of the information submitted in the exposition, that it has the capability to discharge the organization’s obligations:
-with regard to:
-general approval requirements;
-facilities;
-working conditions;
-equipment and tools;
-processes and associated materials;
-number and competence of staff;
-general organization and coordination.
-with regard to management and staff:
-an accountable manager has been nominated by the organization, and is accountable to the Authority. The responsibility of that manager within the organization shall consist of ensuring that all tasks are performed to the required standards and that the organization is continuously in compliance with the data and procedures identified in the exposition;
-a person or group of persons have been nominated to ensure that the organization is in compliance with these requirements, and that they are identified, together with the extent of their authority. Such person(s) shall act under the direct authority of the accountable manager. The persons nominated shall be able to show the appropriate knowledge, background and experience to discharge their responsibilities;
-staff at all levels have been given appropriate authority to be able to discharge their allocated responsibilities and that there is full and effective coordination within the organization in respect of the assessment of organizations that operate or intend to operate SUA.
-with regard to staff who make reports to the Authority and are authorized by the organization to sign the documents issued under the privileges of the Full Category NQE approval:
-the knowledge, background (including other functions in the organization) and experience of the authorized staff are appropriate to discharge their allocated responsibilities;
-the organization maintains a record of all authorized staff, which shall include details of the scope of their authorization; and
-authorized staff are provided with evidence of the scope of their authorization.
Exposition
E15 The organization shall submit to the Authority an exposition providing the following information:
-A statement signed by the Accountable Manager confirming that the exposition and any associated manuals which define the approved organization’s compliance with these requirements will be complied with at all times.
-The title(s) and names of nominated personnel accepted by the Authority.
-The duties and responsibilities of the nominated personnel including matters on which they may deal directly with the Authority on behalf of the organization.
-An organizational chart showing associated chains of responsibility of the nominated personnel.
-A list of staff authorized to submit reports to the Authority.
-A general description of manpower resources.
-A general description of the facilities located at each address specified in the organization’s certificate of approval.
-A general description of the scope of work relevant to the terms of approval.
-The procedure for the notification of organizational changes to the Authority.
-The distribution and amendment procedure for the exposition.
-The procedures and criteria that the organization shall apply to determine whether or not a recommendation should be made to the Authority that a ‘standard’ Authorization be granted to an operator of an SUA, and how any recommendations for limitations and conditions that should apply to that authorization will be determined.
-Arrangements for a formal, periodic internal safety-review that shall be convened at least once in any three calendar month period.
E16 The exposition shall be amended as necessary to maintain an up-to-date description of the organisation, and copies of any amendments shall be supplied to the Authority. Where such amendments change the approval of the organization the amendments will be subject to approval by the Authority.
Changes to the NQE Organization
E17 After the issue of the NQE approval, each change to the organization that is significant to the showing of compliance, conformity or to training of remote pilots and assessment of organization’s operational suitability shall be approved by the Authority.
E18 A change of the location of the facilities, scope of work or methods of training and assessment of the NQE organization are deemed to be substantial changes and therefore necessitate an application to the Authority.
E19 An application for approval for any change shall be submitted to the Authority and before implementation of the change the organization shall demonstrate that it will continue to comply with these requirements after implementation.
Transferability
E20 Approval as a Full Category NQE is not transferable, except as a result of a change in ownership. A change of ownership is considered a significant change and necessitates application to the Authority.
Terms of Approval, Investigations and Findings
E21 The terms of approval shall identify the scope of work for which the holder is entitled to exercise the privileges of the NQE approval. Those terms shall be issued as part of the NQE approval. Each change to the terms of approval shall be approved by the Authority. An application for a change to the terms of approval shall be made in a form and manner established by the Authority. The organization shall comply with the applicable requirements of this document.
E22 The organization shall make arrangements that allow the Authority to make any investigations necessary to determine compliance and continued compliance with these requirements. The organization shall allow the Authority to review any report and make any inspection and perform or witness any flight and ground test necessary to check the validity of the compliance statements submitted.
E23 When objective evidence is found by the Authority showing non-compliance of the holder of a Full Category NQE approval with the applicable requirements, the finding shall be classified as follows:
-A level-one finding is any non-compliance with these requirements that could lead to uncontrolled non-compliances and which could affect the safety of an SUA operation.
-A level-two finding is any non-compliance with these requirements that is not classified as level-one.
E24 After receipt of notification of findings:
-In the case of a level-one finding, the holder of the NQE approval shall demonstrate corrective action to the satisfaction of the Authority within a period of no more than 21 working days after written confirmation of the finding.
-In the case of a level-two finding, the corrective action period granted by the Authority shall be appropriate to the nature of the finding but in any case initially shall not be more than six months. In certain circumstances and subject to the nature of the finding, the Authority may extend the six month period subject to a satisfactory corrective action plan.
E25 In the case of level-one or level-two findings, the NQE approval may be subject to a partial or full suspension or revocation. The holder of the NQE approval shall provide confirmation of receipt of the notice of suspension or revocation of the NQE approval in a timely manner.
Duration and Continued Validity
E26 The period of validity of a Full Category NQE approval shall extend for one calendar year from the date the approval is granted, unless:
-the organization fails to demonstrate compliance with the applicable requirements or any changes to the requirements, criteria or assessment standards that may subsequently be published by the Authority;
-the Authority is prevented by the organization from performing its investigations; or
-there is evidence that the organization cannot maintain satisfactory control of the activities under the NQE approval; or
-the organization no longer meets the eligibility requirements for the NQE approval; or
-the certificate has been surrendered or revoked.
E27 Upon surrender or revocation, the certificate shall be returned to the Authority.
Privileges
E28 A Full Category NQE shall be entitled (within its terms of approval) to report to the Authority that an operator of an SUA has demonstrated the capability to safely operate such aircraft within the specified weight category (class) and that the student meets all of the three critical elements that comprise acceptable evidence of pilot competency. Where this report also includes an assessment of the student’s operations manual as satisfactory, a Full Category NQE’s report (recommendation) may be immediately accepted by the Authority for the grant in full of an Authorization for aerial work.
Obligations of the Holder
E29 The holder of a Full Category NQE approval shall, as applicable:
-ensure that the exposition and the documents to which it refers are used as basic working documents within the organization;
-maintain the organization in conformity with the data and procedures approved for the NQE approval;
-ensure that required manuals or instructions for the assessment of operators are reviewed periodically and approved either by the organization or the Authority as appropriate;
-record all details of work carried out.
Small Unmanned Aircraft – Remote Pilot Theoretical Knowledge / General Airmanship Syllabus
2. Restricted Category Scope
E30 A National Qualified Entity (NQE) for Small Unmanned Aircraft (SUA) is an organization (person) approved by the Authority to carry out assessments of the operators of SUA not exceeding 25 kg mass, and whom is authorized to submit reports and recommendations to the Authority in respect of the operator. Set out below are the requirements to be met by organizations seeking national approval as a Restricted Category NQE.
E31 Any natural or legal person (‘organization’) shall be eligible as an applicant for an approval under these requirements.
E32 The applicant must have held NCAA Authorization for Aerial Work for a minimum period of one year prior to seeking approval as a Restricted Category NQE. Eligibility in meeting these criteria will be verified via the NCAA records system.
Application
E33 Initial applications for approval as a Restricted Category NQE are to be made in writing to uavenquiries@caa.gov.ng using NQE Form. The applicant shall state in Section 5 that they are applying for Restricted Category NQE status. This form will be updated during 2015 to reflect the change to a two-category NQE system.
E34 When applying, the applicant must undertake to pay an annual charge. The initial application charge for one calendar year for a Restricted Category NQE is N100,000 (to be paid on application). The application will not be processed until the initial charge has been received. The approval charge for subsequent years (renewal) will be at the lower rate of N80,000 per annum.
E35 Amendments that result in a substantial change to the approval of the organization will be subject to approval by the Authority and a variation charge of N50,000 will be incurred.
E36 If a Restricted Category NQE wishes to change to a Full Category NQE, the applicable charge will be the difference between the charge for the Restricted Category NQE and the Full Category NQE.
Issue of Approval
E37 An organization shall be entitled to be approved as a Restricted Category NQE by the Authority when it has demonstrated compliance with the applicable requirements.
Requirements for the Grant of Approval
General Requirements
E38 An existing authorization holder that is seeking approval as a Restricted Category NQE must make a distinct division between their general commercial operations and their Restricted Category NQE activities such that the objectivity of the recommendations and reports made under the NQE approval is not called into question.
E39 The entity and the staff responsible for the assessment tasks must have adequate knowledge and competence of the operations of the class of SUA that is to be assessed. The person responsible for conducting the practical flight assessment may also offer suitable training to the student prior to conducting the assessment, however this shall not be mandatory and the student has the right to only undertake the practical flight assessment.
E40 The entity must demonstrate the capability to adequately perform the technical and administrative tasks linked with the assessment process, including the use of personnel, facilities, equipment and record-keeping appropriate to the task. In addition, arrangements shall be made for a formal, periodic internal safety review/meeting that shall be convened at least once in any three calendar month period (quarterly).
E41 The entity must keep the following records for a period of two years:
-A record of each student’s practical flight assessment and any recommendation made to the Authority.
-A record of each quarterly formal, periodic internal safety review/meeting and any subsequent follow-up actions.
E42 The requirements set forth above shall be set out in a separate ‘NQE Exposition’ section included in the Authorisation holder’s existing operations manual. This should include the named person(s) authorized to undertake the practical flight assessments and who are authorized to submit reports to the Authority.
E43 As part of the operations manual, the Exposition shall be amended as necessary to maintain an up-to-date description of the organization, and copies of any amendments shall be supplied to the Authority. Where such amendments change the approval of the organization, the amendments will be subject to approval by the Authority.
E44 The Restricted Category NQE and the staff of the organization shall not disclose information supplied by the operator to any person other than the Authority.
Transferability
E45 Approval as a Restricted Category NQE is not transferable, except as a result of a change of ownership. A change of ownership is considered a significant change and necessitates application to the Authority.
Terms of Approval, Investigations and Findings
E46 The terms of approval shall identify the scope of work for which the holder is entitled to exercise the privileges of a Restricted Category NQE approval. Those terms shall be issued by the Authority as part of the NQE approval.
E47 The organization shall make arrangements that allow the Authority to make any investigations necessary to determine compliance and continued compliance with these requirements. The organization shall allow the Authority to review any report and make any inspection and perform or witness any flight and ground test necessary to check the validity of the compliance statements submitted.
E48 When objective evidence is found by the Authority showing non-compliance of the holder of a Restricted Category NQE approval with the applicable requirements, the finding shall be classified as follows:
-A level-one finding is any non-compliance with these requirements that could lead to uncontrolled non-compliances and which could affect the safety of an SUA operation.
-A level-two finding is any non-compliance with these requirements that is not classified as level-one.
E49 After receipt of notification of findings:
-In the case of a level-one finding, the holder of a Restricted Category NQE approval shall demonstrate corrective action to the satisfaction of the Authority within a period of no more than 21 working days after written confirmation of the finding.
-In the case of a level-two finding, the corrective action period granted by the Authority shall be appropriate to the nature of the finding but in any case initially shall not be more than six months. In certain circumstances and subject to the nature of the finding, the Authority may extend the six month period subject to a satisfactory corrective action plan.
E50 In the case of level-one or level-two findings, the Restricted Category NQE approval may be subject to a partial or full suspension or revocation. The holder of the approval shall provide confirmation to the Authority of receipt of the notice of suspension or revocation of the approval in a timely manner.
Duration and Continued Validity
E51 The period of validity of a Restricted Category NQE approval shall extend for one calendar year from the date the approval is granted, unless:
-the organization fails to demonstrate compliance with the applicable requirements or any changes to the requirements, criteria or assessment standards that may subsequently be promulgated by the Authority.
-the Authority is prevented by the organization from performing its investigations; or
-there is evidence that the organization cannot maintain satisfactory control of the activities under the NQE approval; or
-the organization no longer meets the eligibility requirements for their NQE approval; or
-the certificate has been surrendered or revoked.
E52 Upon surrender or revocation, the certificate shall be returned to the Authority.
Privileges
E53 A Restricted Category NQE shall be entitled to report to the Authority that, following a practical flight assessment, the operator of an SUA has demonstrated the capability to safely and competently operate such an SUA within the specified weight category (class).
Obligations of the Holder – Practical Flight Assessment
E54 Restricted Category NQEs are to ensure that their students are able to satisfactorily demonstrate at least the following skills during the practical flight assessment:
-Pre-flight actions including:
- Mission planning, airspace considerations and site risk-assessment.
- Aircraft pre-flight inspection and set-up (including flight controller modes and power-source hazards).
- Knowledge of the basic actions to be taken in the event of an aircraft emergency or if a mid-air collision hazard arises during the flight.
-In-flight procedures including:
- Maintaining an effective look-out and keeping the aircraft within Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) at all times.
- Performing accurate and controlled flight maneuvers at representative heights and distances (including flight in ‘Atti’ (non-GPS assisted) mode or equivalent where fitted).
- Real-time monitoring of aircraft status and endurance limitations.
- Demonstration of the ‘return-to-home’ function following deliberate control link transmission failure. Fixed-wing aircraft may demonstrate an equivalent procedure that results in a suitable automated, low-impact descent and landing.
-Post flight actions including:
- Shutting down/making-safe the aircraft.
- Post-flight inspection and recording of any relevant data relating to aircraft general condition, aircraft systems, aircraft components and power-sources, controller functionality and crew health and fatigue.
E55 It is not strictly necessary for the holder of a Restricted Category NQE to verify any of the other acceptable alternative evidence of pilot competency. Acceptable evidence of these critical elements should be furnished to the Authority by the individual applicant when he or she applies for an Authorisation for Aerial Work.
Assessment Methodology For BVLOS Operations For RPA NCAA-GAD-AC-06
Assessment Methodology For BVLOS Operations For RPA NCAA-GAD-AC-006
Assessment Methodology For Beyond Visual Line Of Sight Operations For Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)
Short Essay Questions
Question 1
You have been hired by a Drone Startup Company. Your boss has immediately assigned this job to you.
They need you to prepare a one-page memo detailing the legalities of using a drone to film in Nigeria.
They need you to mention any national laws and local ordinances.
They specifically want to know what airspace you will be operating in and whether or not you need an airspace authorization.
Does it matter whether or not you are a citizen of the country?
Lastly, there is a bonus for you if, as you scroll through this chapter, you find any typos or broken links!
Question 2
Do you need a certificate to fly UAS?
If so, how do you obtain one?
Are there fees associated with this?
If so, how much?
Question 3
May you operate beyond visual line of sight?
If so, what procedures must you follow?
Question 4
Does the country have UAM/AAM laws? If so, describe, citing the exact law.
Question 5
Are you aware of any new laws or policies not mentioned above? If so, describe, citing the exact law or policy.
